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THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARDS
As the preceding article in this series has intimated,1 the administrative
problems of U.N. peace-keeping operations cannot be entirely divorced

from the constitutional issues pertaining to their authorization. Thus,
the International Court of Justice, in reaching the conclusion that
neither the operations of United Nations military forces in the Middle
East (UNEF) nor in the Congo (ONUC) were "enforcement" measures
within the exclusive domain of the Security Council under article 42
of the U.N. Charter, did not hesitate to rely upon statements by the
Secretary-General outlining the basic principles which would guide
the operations. 2 Conversely, the Secretary-General, in developing his
formulation of working principles of administration, often emphasized
that they were partly designed to keep the military operations true
to the constitutional distinction between enforcement measures authorized under article 42 and the type of peace keeping represented
by UNEF and ONUC. This is not to suggest, of course, that the
validity of the constitutional distinction and the viability of the prinNathaniel L. Nathanson, Vose Professor of Law, Northwestern University, is a member
of the Massachusetts and Illinois bars. He received his B.A. and LL.B. from Yale University
in 1929 and 1932, respectively, and an S.J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1933. Professor
Nathanson was Visiting Research Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1964-1965.
1 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 621 (1965). It is contemplated that a third article in the series will
focus on the financing of peace-keeping operations.
96
2 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1 2] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 170-71, 175-76. Perhaps
it should be briefly recalled that while UNEF was authorized by the General Assembly and
ONUC by the Security Council, the distinction between "enforcement" measures under
article 42 and peace-keeping operations under some other unspecified articles was relevant
to the validity of ONUG as well as UNEF. This was because the challenge to the validity
of ONUC rested partly upon the proposition that -military action authorized by the
Security Council under article 42 could be carried out only in accordance with agreements
between the Security Council and the member nations, as provided for in article 43, under
the supervision of a military staff committee responsible to the Security Council, as provided for in article 47, and by such members of the United Nations as are chosen by
the Security Council under article 48.
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ciples of administration were unanimously accepted either in the
opinions of the International Court or in the councils of the United
Nations. On the contrary, a profound disbelief in both the soundness
of the distinction and the reliability of the principles of administration
was advanced by France and the Soviet Union as part of the justification for refusing to accept any sharing with the General Assembly of
the Security Council's authority to launch peace-keeping operations or
to approve broad delegations of authority by the Security Council to
3
the Secretary-General to conduct such operations.
The opposition of the Soviet Union, in particular, to broad delegations of authority to the Secretary-General was reflected not only in
its constitutional arguments but also in its political attack upon Mr.
Hammarskjold and its demand for a troika, or three-headed secretariat,
to reflect the three great divisions of political opinion-the western
powers, the socialist states, and the neutralist states-which the Soviet
Union professed at that time to see represented in the United
Nations.4 This proposal led, in turn, to the great philosophical debate
between Chairman Khrushchev and the Secretary-General with respect to the independence and impartiality of the international civil
service, as represented by the top echelons of the Secretariat.
In elaborating his side of the argument, Chairman Khrushchev
broadened his personal attack on Mr. Hammarskjold and his immediate staff to include the proposition: "We cannot expect any SecretaryGeneral to be the impartial representative of three different groups
of states." 5 In responding to this challenge in his famous Oxford
Address, entitled "The International Civil Servant in Law and in
Fact," 6 Mr. Hammarskjold presented his own analysis of the problem.
3 See particularly the statements of the French and Soviet representatives in the Committee of Thirty-Three charged with the responsibility for a "comprehensive review of
peace-keeping operations in all their aspects." U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/SR.7, at 5-6 (1965);
U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/PV.8, at 13-17 (1965), quoted in Nathanson, supra note 1, at
643 n.68, 648-49 respectively. See also the debate on the resolution establishing the U.N.
force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OfF. REc. 19th year, 1102d meeting 21
(S/PV.1102) (1964). Compare debate in Security Council on Secretary-General's implementation of Security Council resolution 211 of Sept. 20, 1965, with respect to the India-Pakistan
question. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Nov. 1965, p. 9.
4 See speech by Chairman Khrushchev, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. R c. 15th Sess., Plenary
68, 82-83 (A/PV.869) (1960).
5 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rre. 15th Sess., Plenary 319 (A/PV.882) (1960). Mr. Khrushchev
added: "We could find for the post of Secretary-General a man from the socialist countries, and such a man would reflect the most progressive ideas of mankind today, ideas for
the preservation of peace. But we can say in advance that the Western Powers would have
no faith in such a man, and that would be understandable." Ibid.
6 Reprinted in HAMMARSKJOLD, SERVANT OF PEACE 329 (1962).
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ie acknowledged that there had been times, particularly in the course
of peace-keeping operations, when, due to the generality of the governing resolutions and the inability of the member nations to agree
upon any further specification of the mandate, the Secretary-General
had been faced with the unhappy choice of either abandoning the
implementation of the resolutions or himself making the critical decisions required. In response to such situations he proposed this fundamental thesis:
The answers seem clear enough in law; the responsibilities
of the Secretary-General under the Charter cannot be laid
aside merely because the execution of decisions by him is
likely to be politically controversial. The Secretary-General
remains under the obligation to carry out the policies as
adopted by the organs; the essential requirement is that he
does this on the basis of his exclusively international responsibility and not in the interest of any particular State or
groups of States.
This presents us with this crucial issue; is it possible for the
Secretary-General to resolve controversial issues on a truly
international basis without obtaining the formal decision of
the organs? In my opinion and on the basis of my experience,
the answer is in the affirmative; it is possible for the SecretaryGeneral to carry out his tasks in controversial political
situations with full regard to his exclusively international
obligation under the Charter and without subservience to a
particular national or ideological attitude. This is not to say
that the Secretary-General is a kind of delphic oracle who
He has availalone speaks for the international community.
7
able for his task varied means and resources.
Mr. Hammarskjold then went on in his address to discuss in general
terms those means and resources. Apart from the various institutional
arrangements of the United Nations, he purported to find guidance in
the "principles and purposes of the Charter ... supplemented by the
body of legal doctrine and precepts that have been accepted by States
generally, and particularly as manifested in the resolutions of UN
organs." 8 He did not assert that such "considerations of principle and
law" would "suffice to settle all the questions posed by the political
tasks entrusted to the Secretary-General." 9 Other sources, including
7 Id. at 346. Hammarskjold also replied more briefly but more specifically in statements
before the General Assembly. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., Plenary 95-96
(A/PV.871) (1960); id. at 331-32 (A/PV.883).
8 HAMMARSKJOLD, SERVANT OF PErACE 346 (1962).
9 Id. at 347.
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consultations with permanent missions of the member nations and with
advisory committees, such as those established for UNEF and ONUC,
would provide "an essential link between the judgment of the executive and the consensus of the political bodies." The consultations mentioned by the Secretary-General are, for the most part, shrouded in
diplomatic privacy. The extent to which they have actually influenced
the decision-making processes of the executive can only be guessed
from the general context of the situation and occasional diplomatic
indiscretions. The "principles and purposes," "legal doctrine and precepts," on the other hand, have been elaborated, not only in the
Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security
Council, but also in the various reports of the Secretariat on the actual
conduct of peace-keeping operations. It is in these reports that we may
find the articulation of what might be termed the administrative standards of peace keeping. It will be the task of this discussion to explore
in some detail the extent to which those who have borne the major
executive responsibilities for peace-keeping operations-particularly in
the Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus-have succeeded in developing
and applying such administrative standards as an alternative to the
purely political judgments which Chairman Khrushchev asserted could
not safely be entrusted to any one man.
The single outstanding document in this voluminous literature is
the report of Secretary-General Hammarskjold to the General Assembly on the early operations of UNEF, entitled, "Summary Study of
the Experience Derived From the Establishment and Operation of the
Force: Report of the Secretary-General."' 0 Because of its unique position as an official attempt to develop generalized guiding principles,
drawn from actual experience, to govern subsequent U.N. adventures
in peace keeping, the Summary Study will be used as the framework
for the analysis of administrative standards, bearing in mind, of course,
that this essay in generalization was made at a relatively early stage
of the relevant experience and must now be checked against subsequent
developments. For purposes of this analysis, the guiding principles
suggested by the Secretary-General may be grouped under four main
headings: (1) the requirement of consent of the host state, (2) the
10 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 13th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 65, at 8 (A/3943)
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Summary Study]. It should also be noted that several of the
principles developed in the Summary Study were anticipated in the Second and Final Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Plan for an Emergency International United Nations
Force, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. Emergency Spec. Sess. I, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 5,
at 19 (A/3302) (1956), and were restated in the First Report of the Secretary-General[on
the operation in the Congo], U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept.
1960, at 16 (A/4389) (1960).
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necessity for freedom of movement, (3) the limitation of force to the
right of self-defense, and (4) the necessity for neutrality or impartiality
with regard to political conflicts..'
I.

THE REQUIREMENT OF CONSENT OF THE HOST STATE

To the extent that the consent of the host state to the introduction of
U.N. peace-keeping forces has been treated as one of the essential indicia
distinguishing such forces from enforcement measures under article 42,
the requirement of consent may properly be regarded as a constitutional rather than an administrative principle. As such it may be
subject to some question or qualification, particularly where the Security Council provides the authorization. 2 However that may be, in the
actual conduct of operations the necessity of consent has been accepted
as a fundamental assumption from which certain consequences naturally flow. One of those consequences has been that there should be a
11 The major themes mentioned in the text do not exhaust those developed in the
Summary Study. Others which might have been mentioned, such as the reservation of
criminal jurisdiction over U.N. armed personnel to their home countries rather than the
host state, have presented no significant difficulties in application and consequently have
been blessed with a quiet or almost nonexistent history. Still others have been concerned
with problems of internal housekeeping or administration which do not bear upon the
political relations between the United Nations and the host state, between the contending
parties, or among the member nations. Finally, any suggestions with regard to financing
have been deliberately excluded, partly as a matter of convenience for separate consideration and partly because they concern not so much the responsibilities of the Secretariat
as the responsibilities of the member nations vis-Ai-vis one another.
12 The Summary Study stated as its very first principle: "As the arrangements discussed
in this report do not cover that type of force envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter,
it follows from international law and the Charter that the United Nations cannot undertake to implement them by stationing units on the territory of a Member State without
the consent of the Government concerned. It similarly follows that the consent of a
Member nation is necessary for the United Nations to use its military personnel or
matirial." Para. 155. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Hammarskjold in writing the
Summary Study apparently had in mind only action by the General Assembly, rather
than the Security Council. This is indicated both by his exclusion of Chapter VII authority and also by his suggestion that the principles suggested "if they were to meet with the
approval of the General Assembly, would provide a continuing basis on which useful
contacts in a stand-by context might be established with interested Governments, with the
aim of being prepared for any requests which might arise from future decisions by the
Assembly on a force or similar arrangement to deal with a specific case." Para. 154.
Nevertheless, Hammarskjold did assume that the requirement of consent was equally applicable in the Congo despite the Security Council resolution, so long as the 'Council did
not purport to take action under article 42 of Chapter VII. Bowett suggests that "this
particular view of the requirement of consent is ill-conceived and unnecessary, and that it
does not automatically follow that every military action short of enforcement measures
decided upon by the Security Council requires the consent of the State on whose territory
such action occurs." Bow-rr, UNITED NATIONS FORcEs 414 (1965). See Nathanson, supra
note 1, at 653 n.89.
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formal agreement between the United Nations and the host state which
will assure to the U.N. Force certain basic rights and conditions essential to its successful operation.' The standard agreements have included, for example, guarantees of freedom with respect to entry and
exit without compliance with passport and visa regulations, freedom
of movement within the area of operations, immunity from criminal
jurisdiction for offenses committed within the territory of the host
state, immunity from civil jurisdiction in matters relating to the official conduct of members of the Force, and many other practical necessities of the Force. Thus far there has apparently been no insuperable
difficulty in securing such a formal agreement containing the guarantees deemed essential by the Secretariat. Consequently it has not been
necessary to return to the General Assembly or the Security Council
for an elaboration of just what is implied by a general request for, or
consent to, the introduction of the U.N. forces.
The Revocability of Consent and Completion of the Mission
This does not mean, however, that the negotiation of the details of
consent has been entirely without its moments of anxiety. The first
concrete problem encountered was whether the consent once given
was revocable at any time by the host state at its own option, or whether
there was some continuing obligation to cooperate with the U.N. forces
until their mission was completed. This problem was encountered in
the case of UNEF even before the entry of the Force when the Egyptian government, after inquiring how long it was contemplated that
the Force would remain in Egypt and finding the Secretary-General's
reply unsatisfactory, suggested that, since Egyptian consent was necessary for entry, it necessarily followed that "if such consent no longer
13 In

the cases of the UNEF and ONUC this agreement was accomplished in

stages. The first consisted of a brief "basic agreement" reflecting in

two

effect the essential

understanding that both parties would be guided in good faith by the governing resolutions. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF.REc. llth Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, at 9-10 (A/3375)
(1956); U.N. SECUITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 27-28
(A/4389/Add5) (1960). The second was a more detailed "Status of Forces" agreement
governing the practical problems of the relationship which experience or foresight indicated were likely to arise. 260 U.N.T.S. 61 (1957); 414 U.N.T.S. 229 (1961). In the case of
Cyprus, both types of provision were telescoped into a single document, the Status of
Forces Agreement. U.N. SFCURrY COUNCIL OFF. R.Ec. 19th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1964,
at 171 (S/5634) (1964). In the case of UNTEA (the United Nations Temporary Executive
Authority in West New Guinea) the only formal agreement was between the parties to
the dispute, the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, but this agreement described
the functions of the U.N. Force and in effect pledged the cooperation of the two nations
concerned with the Secretary-General. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFP. REc. 17th Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Item No. 89 (A/5170) (1962); 437 U.N.T.S. 274 (1962).
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persists, these forces shall withdraw."' 4 The Secretary-General refused
to accept this interpretation on the ground that since the conditions
motivating Egypt's consent to the introduction of the Force were
presumably the same as those which occasioned the General Assembly's
creation of the Force, withdrawal of that consent before the Force had
completed its task would be inconsistent with the acceptance by Egypt
of the decision of the General Assembly. The impasse was finally
broken through intensive personal negotiation between the SecretaryGeneral and President Nasser followed by the adoption of a formula
according to which the government of Egypt declared its willingness
to "be guided in good faith" by its acceptance of the General Assembly
resolution, and the United Nations, "understanding this to correspond
to the wishes of the Government of Egypt," reaffirmed "its willingness
5
to maintain UNEF until its task is completed."'
Just how and by whom it would be determined when the task of
the Force was completed was left to the determination of another day,
should the necessity arise. Thus far it has apparently been the unanimous view of all concerned that the task has not been completed.
Should a difference of opinion arise with respect to that question, it
is difficult to see how the governing resolutions would help to resolve it.
In authorizing the establishment of the Force the General Assembly
stated that its objective was to "secure and supervise the cessation of
hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly Resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November, 1956." 1: That resolution called for a
cease fire, withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, scrupulous
observance of the armistice agreements, reopening of the Suez Canal,
and restoration of freedom of navigation. 7 On the surface of events,
at least, it would appear that all of these objectives have been substantially accomplished.' 8 Nevertheless, the consensus seems to be that
GROSS, THE UNITED NATIONS: STRUCTURE FOR PEACE 31 (1962).
15 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rc. l1th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, at 10 (A/3375)
(1956).
16 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. Ist Emergency Spec. Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 5, at
33 (A/RES/394) (1956).
17 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFr. REc. 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 5,
at 33 (A/RES/390) (1956).
18 There might be some difference of opinion as to whether the armistice agreements
have been scrupulously observed. Border incidents mentioned in UNEF reports appear to
be individual rather than organized derelictions. Reopening of the Suez Canal and restoration of freedom of navigation have been established for all except Israeli shipping and
cargoes.
This was the situation before the outbreak of hostilities and was probably all that
was anticipated by most supporters of the resolution. Freedom of navigation in the Gulf
of Aqaba was probably not within the contemplation of the resolution itself, since the
14
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the situation is not sufficiently stable to permit withdrawal of the
Force. That judgment appears to rest on a political evaluation of the
entire situation in the Middle East. If a difference of opinion should
develop with respect to the desirability of continuing the Force, it
would obviously call for a political solution. Perhaps that is all that
the Secretary-General meant to establish by the good faith formula
embodied in the agreement. 19 Apparently he regarded it as the most
explicit formula which could be expected, for he later stated that it
was "unlikely that any Government in the future would be willing
to go beyond the declaration of the Government of Egypt with regard
to UNEF" and that the United Nations should not "commit itself
beyond the point established for UNEF in relation to the Government
of Egypt." 20
In the case of ONUC, the formula followed was substantially the
same as that of UNEF, except that the United Nations stated it was
"prepared to maintain the United Nations Force in the Congo until
21
such time as it deems the latter's task to have been accomplished."
Conceivably the insertion of the words "it deems" was deliberately
intended to emphasize the importance of the judgment of the United
Nations, as distinguished from that of the host state, in determining
when the mission was completed. 22 However that may be, the actual
word "restoration" hardly applied to that situation. Nevertheless, since the establishment of such freedom had been one of the major objectives of the Israeli invasion, it could
hardly be divorced from the problem of withdrawal and the take-over by U.N. forces, as
developed more fully later on. Concern as to what would happen at Sharm el Sheikh, at the
entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, in the event of the termination of UNEF may be one of
the reasons for its continuance.
The most recent examination of the need for continuation of UNEF is to be found
in Survey of the United Nations Emergency Force, U.N. Doc. No. A/C.5/1049, para. 16,
at 10 (1965), whch states: "Its observation of the current situation on the Line has led
the Survey Team to conclude that little purpose would be served by a redefinition of the
mandate of the Force at this time, since UNEF's functioning, as developed in practice
over the years, dearly fulfills a still pressing need in acting as an informal buffer between
the armed forces of Israel and the United Arab Republic, and the situation on the Line
has not in recent years changed in a way which would justify a formal change in the
mandate."
19 Hammarskjold's way of saying this was: "The consequence of such a bilateral declaration is that, were either side to act unilaterally in refusing continued presence or deciding
on withdrawal, and were the other side to find that such action was contrary to a goodfaith interpretation of the purposes of the operation, an exchange of views would be
called for towards harmonizing the positions." Summary Study, para. 158.
20 Summary Study, para. 159.
21 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 28 (S/4389/
Add.5) (1960).
22 Cf. BowETr, op. cit. supra note 12, at 420-22. Bowett also suggests that the reason
why "the Congolese government was prepared to go further than the Egyptian Government and to relinquish any unilateral right to require withdrawal is probably explained
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course of events did not put this particular theory to the test.23 In point

of fact it was neither the host government nor the Security Council
which decreed the termination of ONUC. In his final report on the
operations of ONUC, the Secretary-General, U Thant, gave three
reasons for its withdrawal on June 30, 1964: first, no request had
been made by the Republic of the Congo for its extension beyond that
date; second, extension would require a special session of the General
Assembly, which had thus far authorized expenditure to June 30, 1964,
and not beyond; and finally, further extension of the Force would
provide no solution of the troubles of the Congo, because the United
Nations "cannot permanently protect the Congo, or any other country,
from the internal tensions and disturbances created by its own organic
growth toward unity and nationhood."24 In short, the withdrawal of
ONUC came not so much from any specific determination that its
task was completed, as from the growing acceptance of the view on
the part of the Secretary-General, the host government, and the supporting powers that its usefulness was largely over.2 5 In a certain sense

it might be said that the particular tasks envisaged at the outset had
been completed, namely, the withdrawal of Belgian forces and the
assurance of territorial integrity insofar as that was threatened by
secession of Katanga. Nevertheless, a considerable measure of internal
disorder persisted, both in the form of rather pointless violence by
marauding armed bands and of civil strife resulting from organized
rebellion against the Central Government. 2 While the U.N. Force conby the fact that it was not in a position to surrender such a right: it did not possess it."
Id. at 421-22. This seems to be a rather over-sophisticated rationalization of the change
in language.
23 It was somewhat tangentially involved in a dispute between President Kasavubu
and the Secretary-General with respect to the conduct of the operations of ONUC. In
rejecting certain conditions on such operations suggested by representatives of the President, the Secretary-General relied partly on the proposition that "only the Security Council
can decide on the discontinuance of the operation, and that, therefore, conditions which,
by their effect on the operation, would require direct consideration by the Security Council, which obviously could not be counted upon to approve of such conditions unless it
were to find that the threat to peace and security had ceased." U.N. SEcRuTY COUNCIL
OFF. Rxc. 16th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1961, at 263 (S/4775) (1961).
24 Report of the Secretary-General on the Withdrawal of United Nations Force in the
Congo and on Other Aspects of the United Nations Operation There, U.N. Doc. No.

S/5784, at 42 (1964).
25 This view may also have been influenced by the deepening financial crisis and concern
about the source of the money. Indeed the Secretary-General said quite frankly: "This
consideration naturally exerts a very strong influence on my thinking about the question
of military disengagement." Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Question of Military
Disengagement in the Congo (Leopoldville), U.N. SEcuRrrY COUNCIL OFF. Rlc. 18th year,
Supp. July-Sept. 1963, at 168 (S/5428) (1963).
26 See U.N. Doc. No. S/5784, paras. 7-64 (1964); Hoskyns, The Tshombe Regime, 21
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ducted some important rescue operations during its final period, in
general the U.N. Command did not seem disposed to take the initiative
in courting additional involvement.2 7 Hostility between the U.N. Command and the commander of Central Government forces may have
been partly responsible for this relatively inactive period in the life of
the Force, which may suggest that the issue of continuing consent, in
certain circumstances, may be quite an academic one, since the usefulness of the force may depend in no small measure upon affirmative
cooperation between the host government and the U.N. forces.
The "good faith" formula, with slight variations, was also repeated
in the case of Cyprus, in an exchange of letters between the SecretaryGeneral and the government of the Republic of Cyprus. 28 No reference was made in this exchange to the completion of the task, and this
may well have been a deliberate omission in the light of the fact that
the authorizing resolution recommended that "the stationing of the
force shall be for a period of three months." This brief authorization
was, of course, a practical response to the exigencies of voluntary
financing, but it also suggested that the desirability of continuing the
Force would be determined periodically by the Security Council in
the light of prevailing circumstances. A natural corollary would seem
to be that the consent of the host state was also limited to the period
mentioned in the resolution and would have to be renewed, explicitly
or tacitly, at each renewal of the authorization by the Security Council. In actual practice, the consent of the government of the Republic
of Cyprus to the continuation of the Force has been expressed to the
Security Council before the adoption of the resolutions extending the
life of the Force. 29 Thus there has been in effect a consensus among all
concerned that the task of the Force has not been completed, in much
WORLD TODAY 43 (1965); Hoskyns, The Congo as the UN Leaves, 20 WORLD TODAY 231

(1964).
27 LEFEvER, CRISIS IN THE CoNGo 132-33 (1965). On the other hand, it should be noted
that a request by Prime Minister Adoula for the aid of ONUC in subduing rebellion in
Kivu province was refused because of the repatriation schedule of the troops. ONUC
supplied arms to the ANC instead. U.N. Doc. No. S/5784, paras. 63-66 (1964).
28 The Secretary-General stated that "I wish to affirm that the activities of the Force
will be guided in good faith by the task established for the Force by the Security Council."
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REG. 19th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1964, at 181 (S/5634) (1964).
In reply the government of the Republic of Cyprus stated that it would also "be guided
in good faith, when exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence
and functioning of the Force, by its acceptance of the recommendation of the Security
182.
Council that a peace-keeping force be established in Cyprus." Id. at
29 See, for example, the statement of the Representative of Cyprus on June 15, 1965,
agreeing to a six month's extension of the Force as proposed by the Secretary-General.
U.N. Doe. No. S/PV.1224, at 6.
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the same sense as such a judgment has been reached with respect to
the continuation of UNEF.
Both the situations in Cyprus and on the Israeli-Egyptian border
pose the perplexing questions whether the task of a peace-keeping
force can ever be completed in the absence of a settlement of the underlying disagreement and whether the presence of the Force makes any
contribution towards the achievement of such a settlement. 30 Although
these are questions far beyond the scope of this discussion, they are,
nonetheless, relevant to the general issue of the role of the SecretaryGeneral in both the initiation and termination of U.N. peace-keeping
operations. In the Congo the initiative came very largely from the
Secretary-General; in the case of UNEF and Cyprus, primarily from
the member nations. In either event the desirability of such an initiative must surely involve political judgments which defy attempts at
systematic rationalization of the type here under consideration. 31 The
same might be said almost as categorically of the problem of termination. This does not necessarily exclude the Secretary-General from a
significant participation, but it does significantly change the nature of
the participation from that of an executive authorized to make decisions to that of an advisor whose judgment may or may not be highly
valued. Thus, in developing the "good faith" formula as an answer to
the problem of the termination of peace-keeping operations, the Secretary-General was preserving not so much his own authority as that of
the General Assembly and the Security Council.
The Composition of the Forces
The Secretary-General in the Summary Study also considered the
application of the principle of consent by the host state to the national
composition of the U.N. forces, particularly with regard to whether the
host state should have a veto over the inclusion of military units from
any particular state. The Secretary-General's resolution of this problem
was to suggest that "while it is for the United Nations alone to decide
on the composition of military elements sent to a country, the United
Nations should, in deciding on composition, take fully into account
the view of the host Government as one of the most serious factors
30 The Secretary-General himself raises these questions, both in the latest report on
Cyprus, U.N. Doc. No. S/7001, paras. 205-07 (1965), and in the Introduction to the Annual
Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1964-15 June
1965, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rac. 20th Sess., Supp. No. 1A, at 7 (A/6001/Add.1) (1965).
31 Compare
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personnel." 32

which should guide the recruitment of the
In order to
reduce the possible area of disagreement, the Secretary-General suggested two subordinate principles, namely, that the force should not
include units from any permanent members of the Security Council,
nor units from "any country which, because of its geographical position or for other reasons, might be considered as possibly having a
special interest in the situation which has called for the operation." 3
Another subordinate principle, not developed explicitly in the Summary Study but mentioned later in connection with the Congo, is the
inclusion of "an element of universality, natural-and indeed essential-to any United Nations operation." 34
In suggesting both the general formula and the subordinate principles, the Secretary-General doubtless had in mind some of the specific
problems which had arisen in connection with UNEF. Since England
and France were directly involved in the dispute, it was obvious that
their troops could not be included, and since one of the primary objectives of the entire operation was to secure the withdrawal of English
and French forces, it may have appeared axiomatic that no other great
power forces should be introduced into the area. This may have been
even more apparent from the suggestion of the USSR that "all States
Members of the United Nations, especially the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" should intervene
with their troops to ensure the French and English withdrawal.5 Egypt
had also objected to the introduction of Canadian infantry troops on
the ground that their resemblance to the British might inflame Egyptian
public opinion, and to the contribution of troops by Pakistan and New
Zealand because of views expressed by those states in regard to the
underlying dispute about the Suez Canal; the Secretary-General had
yielded, at least in part, to both of these objections. 36
In the case of the Congo, although no Great Power was directly
involved, another aspect of the situation militated perhaps just as
strongly against the inclusion of Great Power units in the U.N. Force.
A primary diplomatic objective in sending a U.N. force into the Congo
32 Summary Study, para. 161.
33 Id. para. 160.
34 First Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year,
Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 20 (S/4389) (1960). The principle of universality was developed
partly in response to the demand for an all-African force.
35 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. l1th year, 755th meeting 7 (S/P.755) (1956); U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. l1th year, Supp. Oct.-Dec. 1956, at 128-29 (S/3736) (1956).
86 Cf. BowrrT, op. cit. supra note 12, at 110-11; RosNa, THE UNnI- NATIONS ETERGENCY FORcE 55-56 (1963); Goodrich & Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, 11
INT'L ORGANIZATION

413, 423-24 (1957).

1966]

Constitutional Crisis at the U.N.

was to prevent that newly independent country from becoming a cockpit of contention among the Great Powers.3 7 Under those circumstances,
the application of the Secretary-General's principle against the inclusion of units of permanent members of the Security Council seemed
all the more imperative. The application of the Secretary-General's
other principle, against the inclusion of troops of members having a
special interest in the situation, presented a harder problem-to what
extent, if at all, this proscription should apply to contributions by
neighboring African states. The Secretary-General concluded from
the outset that in this situation geographical proximity did not imply
"special interest" in the sense mentioned in the Summary Study. Quite
the contrary, he indicated in his First Report that ONUC would be
"built around a hard core of military units from African States," although other choices would be made with a view toward "maintaining
the universal character of a United Nations operation." 38
We find the subordinate principles suggested in the Summary Study
with respect to the composition of the force bending still further in the
case of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This was
illustrated primarily by the United Kingdom's contribution of the
largest unit involved, in clear violation of the injunction against the
inclusion of a Great Power contribution and also perhaps in violation
of the proscription against participation by a state having a special
interest. 39 The obvious reason for inclusion of the British unit was
37 See LASH, DAG HAMMARSKJOLD 223-27 (1961); cf. HOSKYNS, THE CONGO SINCE INDEPENDENCE 113-15 (1965).
38 First Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SaeuxuTy COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year,
Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 20, 22 (S/4389) (1960). In accordance with this policy substantial
contributions were accepted from Ethiopia, Morocco, Ghana, Nigeria, and Tunisia, but
there were also contributions from Europe, South America, Asia, and North America. The
largest contribution came from India, and the next largest from Morocco, Ethiopia, and
Ghana. However, the Moroccans were withdrawn in whole and the Ghanaians in part before the operation was substantially completed, due to dissatisfaction with its direction;
had it not been for the staunch support of India and Ethiopia the whole enterprise would
have floundered in midstream. Of course, there was in the Congo the special problem
of sensitivity to white troops, as successors to the colonialists, particularly the Belgians, in
addition to the Secretary-General's concern with respect to direct involvement of the Great
Powers. Here again the Canadian troops were the butt of the attack, both from the Soviet
Union, because they represented a NATO power and therefore an ally of Belgium, and
from the Congolese government because they were "white." The Secretary-General refused
to yield to either objection on the ground that the Canadians provided certain skills
which were essential. Bowr, op. cit. supra note 12, at 205-08.
39 Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the United Nations
Operation in Cyprus, for the Period of 26 April to 8 June 1964, U.N. Doc. No. S/5764,
at 2, 16 (1964). There were a total of 1,792 United Kingdom troops out of a total of 6,411
at the close of this period. Id. at 2. The delicacy of the issue of composition was emphasized
by the requirement in the authorizing resolution of consultation with Cyprus, Greece,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. U.N. Doc. No. S/5575 (1964).
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that it was already on the spot and had, with Greek and Turkish
forces, been trying to keep the peace for some time before the matter
was brought before the Security Council. Furthermore, in the discussions of the Security Council, and so far as appears in informal negotiations preceding the formal decision, there was no suggestion that
other great powers would feel the need to be represented if the British
unit participated or that its continued presence would increase the difficulties faced by the United Nations in maintaining impartial positions
among the contending parties. In a general sense there was certainly
a special interest arising from the facts that Cyprus had been a British
Crown Colony, that the United Kingdom was a party to the London
and Zurich agreements of 1959 which established the basis for Cyprus
as an independent nation, and that the United Kingdom reserved a
right of intervention under certain circumstances as well as two sovereign base areas on the Island of Cyprus under the terms of another
treaty. 40 Against these apparently substantial items of special interest,
it might also be said, however, that the United Kingdom, unlike the
two other participating powers, Greece and Turkey, had no special
interest in how the conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities was to be resolved and could therefore provide troops who were
just as likely to be impartial as those of any other nation. The ultimate test was, of course, the willingness of the contending factions to
accept British participation.
It might also be noted that the composition of UNFICYP did not go
very far in achieving the element of "universality" which was considered to be at least prima facie desirable in the case of UNEF and
ONUC, although it was not included as an item of general principle
in the Summary Study.41 The countries represented in UNFICYP were
Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand,
See Issues before the Twentieth General Assembly, Int'l Conc., Sept. 1965, pp. 45-51.
Even more exceptional than UNFICYP was the composition of the United Nations
Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) in connection with UNTEA, the United
Nations Temporary Executive Authority, for that territory, pending its transfer from the
Netherlands to Indonesia. The Force consisted almost entirely of Pakistanis, with a smattering of special Canadian and United States personnel. The almost sole reliance upon
Pakistanis has been explained on the ground that "it was estimated that about one
battalion was all that was needed, and it would have led to unnecessary complications to
accept small contingents from several States in order to make up the one battalion
required." BowEar, op. cit. supra note 12, at 259. The use of United States Air Force personnel might be viewed simply as more explicit recognition than usual of the large role
played by the United States Air Force in providing air transport for all of the U.N. peacekeeping operations, and an indication as well that the unanimity of the Great Powers on
the West Irian operation relieved the Secretary-General of any fears of embarrassment on
account of "Great Power involvement."
40
41
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and Sweden. But the reports do not disclose whether there were no
African, Asian, or Latin American countries represented simply because
no offers of contingents from those areas were made or because the
Secretary-General rejected such offers. At the time that UNFICYP was
created both UNEF and ONUC were still in operation, although the
latter was rapidly drawing to a close. The composition of those units
might conceivably have had some influence upon the composition
of the new Force, since there is something to be said for distributing
the total burden of contributing manpower to existing peace-keeping
forces among as many nations as possible so as to broaden both the
experience and interest of member nations in operations of this nature.
Although some countries were substantially represented in all three
forces, there were also some, in addition to the United Kingdom, who
42
contributed to only one of them.
Obviously the Secretary-General's subordinate principles regarding
the composition of U.N. forces have yielded on occasion to the exigencies of circumstances. This should not be surprising since composition is an intensely practical matter depending on a host of variables.
Nevertheless, in negotiating with an especially sensitive host state, or
in choosing among a profusion of riches from contributing states, it
may well be helpful for the Secretary-General to have guidelines, bearing a general stamp of approval from either the General Assembly
or the Security Council, to fall back upon. They tend to make it easier
for the Secretary-General to refuse to accede to the irresponsible whim
of the host state and also to reject without offense the offers of wouldbe contributors. They also suggest that the choice among offers will
not itself be whimsical and that the legislative authority has established
some guidelines for the exercise of executive authority in making that
choice. The barring of contributions by permanent members may be
somewhat questionable as a long run proposition, yet this was plainly
a helpful rule in the Congo and may prove to be equally so in other
situations where one of the cardinal objectives is to forestall Great
Power involvement. Where this consideration is not present, and there
42 See Report by the Secretary-General,U.N. Doc. No. S/5764, at 2 (1964) (composition
of UNFICYP); RoSNER, op. cit. supra note 36, at 122-23 (composition of UNEF); BowErr,
op. cit. supra note 12, at 206 (composition of ONUC). On September 15, 1957, UNEF consisted of 5,977 officers and men from Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Finland, India,
Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. By August 22, 1962, the number had been
reduced to 5,133 and Columbia, Finland, and Indonesia had withdrawn. During its lifetime ONUC included contributions from Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada,
Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Liberia,
Malaya, Mali, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Sierra
Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia.
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is real need for Great Power contribution, the rule may of course be
waived as it was in Cyprus. Finally, there is something to be said for
the general proposition that the smaller nations should provide the
manpower while the Great Powers carry the lion's share of the expense.
The element of universality is also somewhat questionable as an important desideratum in any particular force. The important consideration would seem to be to spread the total experience of peace keeping
among as many nations as possible.

II.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Particularly important and even controversial in the light of future
developments was the principle mentioned in the Summary Study that
"the United Nations activity should have freedom of movement within
its area of operations and all such facilities regarding access to that
area and communications as are necessary for successful completion
of the task." 43 As the Secretary-General explicitly recognized, the principle so stated "requires an agreement on what is to be considered as
the area of operations and as to what facilities of access and communications are to be considered necessary." 44 It was, however, something of
an oversimplification for the Secretary-General to add: "On the
assumption that, like UNEF, any similar United Nations operation
in the future would be of assistance to the nation on whose territory
it is stationed, it is not to be expected that the necessary process of
agreement will give rise to any serious complications in the interpreta45
tion of the principle."
If all the Secretary-General meant by this last remark was that there
should be little difficulty in reaching agreement on the verbal formula
expressing the concept of freedom of movement, his prediction was
borne out by subsequent events. Thus, in the original agreement of
July 19, 1960, between the United Nations and the government of
the Republic of the Congo, the government did not hesitate to assume
the obligation that "it will ensure the freedom of movement of the
Force in the interior of the country and will accord the requisite
privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the activities
of the Force." 46 Even more explicit was the provision with respect to
"Freedom of Movement" agreed to by the United Nations and the
Republic of Cyprus. This provision read: "The force and its members
43
44
45
46

Summary Study, para. 164.
Ibid.
Ibid.
U.N. SECURrTy COUNCIL OrF. REc. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 28 (S/4389/

Add.5) (1960).
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together with its service vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment shall
enjoy freedom of movement throughout Cyprus. Wherever possible
the Commander will consult with the Government with respect to
large movements of personnel, stores or vehicles on roads used for
general traffic. The Government will supply the Force with maps and
other information, including locations of dangers and impediments,
which may be useful in facilitating its movements." 47 Difficulties came
not in the formulation but in the implementation of these understandings.
In the Congo the most notable examples of these difficulties occurred
when the U.N. Force was denied entry into Katanga for some time and
was, even after entry, strictly confined in its area of operations there
until after pitched battles with Tshombe's forces. Here, however, the
basis of the original difficulty was not the unwillingness of the Central
Government to honor its commitment, but rather its inability to do so.
The Central Government was only too willing to "ensure" ONUC's
entry into Katanga, if ONUC would fight its way in by force of arms. 48

Thus, Hammarskjold was presented with an apparent direct conflict
between two of his basic principles-the right to freedom of movement
and the commitment that armed force would be used only in selfdefense. The Secretary-General's immediate solution of this dilemma
was to sacrifice freedom of movement to the principle of self-defense
by canceling the projected airlift of U.N. forces into Katanga when,
after preliminary reconnaissance, his representative, Ralph J. Bunche,
reported that such an operation could not be effected without use
of force.49 His long-term solution was to preserve both principles by
47 U.N. SECUar COUNCIL OFF. REC. 19th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1964, at 178 (S/5634)
(1964). The agreement contained this additional relevant provision: "The Force shall have
the right to the use of roads, bridges, canals and other waters, port facilities and airfields
without the payment of dues, tolls or charges either by way of registration or otherwise,
throughout Cyprus." Ibid.
The comparable provision on freedom of movement in the UNEF Status of Forces
Agreement read in part: "The Force and its members shall enjoy together with service
vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment, freedom of movement between Force Headquarters, camps and other premises, within the area of operations, and to and from points
of access to Egyptian territory agreed upon or to be agreed upon by the Egyptian Government and the Commander. . . . The Government of Egypt recognizes the right of the
Force and its members to freedom of movement across armistice demarcation lines and
other military lines in the performance of the functions of the Force and the official
duties of its members." 260 U.N.T.S. 78 (1957). There has been no indication of any
difficulties experienced in the application of this provision. The Status of Forces agreement
eventually reached for the Congo contained substantially the same provision as that for
Cyprus.
48 HOSKYNS, op. cit. supra note 37, at 160; LAH, op. cit. supra note 37, at 234-35.
49 Hammarskjold's instructions to Bunche regarding this reconnaissance trip made it
clear that the Secretary-General had already decided, in advance of Bunche's report, to
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reliance upon painstaking negotiations, coupled with assurance from
the Security Council that the U.N. Force would "not be a party to or
in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any
internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise." 50 In this approach he
was at least partially successful, achieving a token peaceful entry of U.N.
forces into Elisabethville and several other places in Katanga. 51 But it
was not until sometime after Hammarskjold's death that ONUC was
able to achieve full freedom of movement throughout Katanga. This
in turn involved some delicate judgments as to the outer limits of selfdefense, which will be further explored later.
It was not only in Katanga, however, that the Secretary-General
encountered considerable difficulty in implementing the theoretical
cancel the projected entry if it appeared that force would be required. Hammarskjold
wrote: "Should you arrive at the conclusion that resistance by force represents a serious
risk in view of the attitude of leaders, and that for that reason you have to advise against
entry of United Nations troops, I shall, upon receipt of your report, ask for the immediate
convening of the Security Council to which I shall .present a complete report on what has
occurred, with a request for instructions." Second Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
SFCURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 51 (S/4417) (1960). Even
when the Secretary-General did present -the problem to the Security Council for further
instructions, he did not suggest an authorization to use force in order to effect an entry
into Katanga. On the contrary his position was strongly against any such authorization, as
indicated by the following statement in his Report to the Council: "If the Council, as it
is assumed, wishes to maintain its objectives, the Council must, therefore, either change
the character of the Force, which appears to me to be impossible, both for constitutional
reasons and in view of the commitments to the contributing Governments, or resort to
other methods which would enable me to carry through the implementation of its resolution without going beyond my instructions as regards the Force." Id. at 52-53.
The Secretary-General then proceeded to outline the "other methods" which might be
used to accomplish the U.N. objectives. These were, in effect, reassurance from the Security
Council that entry of the U.N. Force into Katanga would not "submit the province to the
immediate control and authority of the Central Government" and would not "mean any
taking of sides in the conflict" as to whether there was to be a "strictly unitarian" form of
government in the Congo or "some kind of federal structure providing for a higher degree
of provincial self-government than now foreseen." Id. at 53.
Substantially the same views were also expressed by the Secretary-General in his oral
presentations to the Security Council on August 8, 1960. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC.
15th year, 884th meeting 2-6 (A/PV.884) (1960); id. 885th meeting 22-23 (S/PV.885).
He did, however, in the first oral statement seem to recognize the possibility of Security
Council authorization to make a forceful entry "in that case naturally using only contingents representing Governments which would accept such a new stand by the Council."
Id. 884th meeting 3 (S/PV.884).
50 Resolution, Aug. 9, 1960, U.N. SECURrrY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. JulySept. 1960 (S/4426) (1960). The resolution also called -upon the "Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the province of Katanga under
speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General" and declared the entry of U.N.
forces into Katanga necessary for the full implementation of this resolution. These
provisions, also suggested by the Secretary-General, were designed to strengthen his hand
in negotiations with both Belgian and Katangese authorities.
51 HosKyNs, op. cit. supra note 37, at 170-75; IFEvER, op. cit. supra note 27, at 39-40.
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agreement with respect to "freedom of movement" embodied in the
basic agreement of July 19, 1960, between the United Nations and the
Republic of the Congo. This was emphatically illustrated in the exchanges between the Secretary-General and his representatives, on the
one hand, and the President of the Republic of the Congo and his
representatives, on the other, with respect to the presence of U.N.
forces at the Leopoldville (Ndjili) Airport and other key transportation
points within the Central Government's area of effective control. This
exchange opened with a communication from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Congo to the representative of the
Secretary-General asserting that "the air force installations at Ndjili
must be evacuated without delay by United Nations forces and personnel stationed there. No agreement between the Congolese Government and ONUC exists on the matter. ' 5 This communication came at
the time immediately following the murder of Lumumba, when relations between the United Nations and the Kasavubu-Mobutu government in Leopoldville were sorely strained. In addition, the Security
Council had just passed its Resolution of February 21, 1961, urging the
United Nations "to take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including ...

the use

resort." 53

of force, if necessary, in the last
The resolution also urged
that Parliament be convened and that "Congolese armed units and
personnel should be re-organized and brought under discipline and
control." 54 Because this resolution had apparently been misinterpreted
in Leopoldville as indicating the intention of disarming the ANC
(Armee Congolaise Nationale) and putting the Congo under some kind
of trusteeship, 55 the Secretary-General undertook to allay unfounded
apprehension. The Security Council decision, he explained, called for
neither the expulsion of foreign technicians from the country nor the
disarming of the ANC. Instead, he said, it referred only to "foreign
military and paramilitary personnel, political advisers and mercenaries" and the reference to reorganizing the ANC contemplated only
"bringing it under discipline and control, and making arrangements
with a view to eliminating interference by its units and personnel in
52 Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, March 3, 1961, U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc.

16th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1961, at 211 (S/4758) (1961). The

ultimatum about the Ndjili airport was followed shortly by reports of interference with
U.N. installations at other transportation centers, such as the Moanda airfield and the port
of Matadi. Id. at 214, 219.
53

Resolution, Feb. 21, 1961, U.N.

SECURITY COUNCIL OFF.

March 1961, at 147 (S/4741) (1961).
54 Id. at 148
55 HOSKYNS, op. cit. supra note 37, at 338.

Rtc. 16th year, Supp. Jan.-
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the Congo's political life-an aim which most recent events have fully
justified." 56 But with respect to the demand for the evacuation at
Ndjili, the Secretary-General's reply was unyielding: "The air force
installations are essential to the entire United Nations operation in
the Congo and particularly to the communications required for the
Force. Consequently the measures contemplated by the Government
would constitute a direct violation of the basic agreement of 27 July
1960 by which the Government undertook to ensure the freedom of
movement of the Force throughout the country and to carry out in
good faith its obligations under the resolutions with respect to the
Force."

57

It may be noticed that the Secretary-General in the foregoing passage
somewhat improved on the language of the July 27th agreement with
respect to "freedom of movement." In the agreement of July 27th the
government had simply promised to "ensure the freedom of movement
of the Force in the interior of the Country" and to "accord the requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the
activities of the Force."5 8 It was not until after the death of Hammarskjold that the more elaborate agreement of November 27, 1961, spelled
out the exact elements of "freedom of movement" in a way comparable
to his insistence in the exchanges with the Central Government concerning the air force installations. The November 27th agreement,
which was theoretically retroactive to the date of the first arrival of
U.N. contingents in the Congo, expanded on the prior agreement by
providing: "The Government shall afford the members of the Force
and the officials serving under the United Nations in the Congo full
freedom of movement throughout Congolese territory and to and
from points of access to Congolese territory. This freedom shall extend
to the operation of vehicles, aircraft, vessels and equipment in the
service of the United Nations."59 But even this provision did not
answer the exact question posed by the demand for evacuation of the
air force installations at Ndjili-whether the guarantee of freedom
of movement included the right to U.N. military control of key facilities
of transportation. One can fully support Hammarskjold's judgment in
56 Report by the Secretay-General,U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. Rac. 16th year, Supp.

Jan.-March 1961, at 217 (S/4758) (1961).
57 Id. at 218. The Secretary-General was equally insistent upon the U.N. right to maintain military installations at the port of Matadi in order to protect the movement of its own
supplies. Id. at 221, 226.
58 U.N. SEcuRrrY COUNCIL OFF. R EC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 28 (S/4389/
Add.5) (1960).
59 414 U.N.T.S. 245 (1961).
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insisting upon that right in the circumstances and yet appreciate the
government's concern about surrendering such control to possibly unfriendly hands. 60
Interference with ONUC's freedom of movement also played a
large part in provoking the vigorous but intermittent military actions
between December 1961 and January 1963 which finally ended the
secession of Katanga. Thus, there seemed no reasonable basis for doubt
that by December 1961 ONUC's freedom of movement had been
genuinely limited by the establishment of roadblocks which cut the
camps off from each other and made it impossible for them to aid one
another in case of attack. 61 But ONUC's effort to establish by force
its freedom of movement throughout Katanga was suspended short of
accomplishing that objective when year-long negotiations began in
January 1962 between Tshombe and his supporters, on the one hand,
and the Kasavubu-Adoula Central Government on the other, with
regard to the exact form of a federal state which was to supplant the
Loi fondamentale, bequeathed to the Congo by Belgium. 62 During
this period the United Nations also attempted to realize through
negotiations its right to freedom of movement throughout Katanga,
especially in the neighborhood of Jadotville and Kolwezei, industrial
centers of the Union Miniere 6 3 Despite these efforts, the closing days
of 1962 revealed no substantial progress on either the political or the
military fronts. Instead there was deterioration in ONUC's effective
freedom of movement until the U.N. forces launched, between December 28, 1962, and January 8, 1963, their second series of military actions; 64 thanks partly to a failure of communications between the
Secretary-General's offices in New York and the officers in the field,
these operations were not halted until the Katanga gendarmerie were
60 Kasavubu might have recalled, in this connection, that similar control of the airfields
by the United Nations, when used to close them to all but U.N. traffic, had operated very
much in his own favor in his struggle with Lumumba. This incident is considered later in
connection with the obligation of impartiality. See text accompanying note 170 infra.
61 Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo Concerning the Situation in Elisabethville, U.N. SECUITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 16th year, Supp.
Oct.-Dec. 1961, at 37, 47, 51, 57 (S/4940/Adds.16,17,18,19) (1961); HOSKYNS, op. cit. supra
note 37, at 447-55.
62 See LEFEvEr, op. cit. supra note 27, at 99-107; Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the
United Nations Operations in the Congo, U.N. SECURrrY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year,
Supp. April-June 1962, at 1-93 (S/5053/Add.10) (1962); id. Supp. Oct.-Dec. 1962, at 30
(S/5053/Add.13); id. at 141 (S/5053/Add.13fAdd.1).
63 U.N. SEcURIrY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1962, at 29 (S/5053/
Add.7) (1962).
64 U.N. SECUR Y COUNCIL OFF. REc. 18th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1963, at 1-13
(S/5053/Add.14) (196.3).
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completely dispersed, the industrial area around Jadotville occupied,
and the Tshombe government in full flight. 65 Then and then only was
the Secretary-General able to announce triumphantly:
Full freedom of movement for ONUC personnel throughout
Katanga has thus been fully and firmly established. ONUC
could never hope to discharge the mandates given to it with
regard to law and order, prevention of civil war, and the elimination of mercenaries without freedom of movement. It was
with this in mind that freedom of movement for ONUC was
provided for in the Plan.66
Viewed merely in the light of the specific actions by Katangese and
U.N. military forces, there can be little serious question that vindication of ONUC's right to freedom of movement, as well as its right of
self-defense, provided an appropriate rationalization for its military
actions. But as the Secretary-General's statement itself suggests, the
conflict over ONUC's freedom of movement in Katanga cannot be
realistically understood without some consideration of the more fundamental objectives of its presence there. This was particularly so after
the final Security Council Resolution of November 24, 1961, which
authorized "the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including
the use of a requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate
apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of
all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisors
,67
not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries ....
The resolution further declared that "all secessionist activities against
the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the 'Loi fondamentale' and
Security Council decisions" and specifically demanded that "such ac68
tivities which are now taking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith.."
Against the background of those provisions, and the pressure to implement them, it is not surprising that the Katangese leaders should
have regarded the presence of ONUC as a threat both to Katanga's
independence and their own authority. Yet by yielding to their own
fears and interfering with the normal operations of the force the nervous Katangese in effect relieved the United Nations of having to
decide whether military action could ever have appropriately been
taken to evacuate the mercenaries and terminate secession.
65

Id. at 13-21; id. at 60-78 (S/5053/Add.15).

66 Report of the Secretary-General, Feb. 4, 1963, U.N. SFcuRrrY COUNCIL OFF. Rac.

18th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1963, at 94 (S/5240) (1963).
67

Resolution, Nov. 24, 1961, U.N.

SECURrrY

Oct.-Dec. 1961, at 148, 149 (S/5002) (1961).
68

Ibid.
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In Cyprus, too, the implementation of the right to "freedom of
movement" proved to be a thorny issue, as it came into conflict with
rights asserted by the government of the Republic of Cyprus and by the
Turkish Cypriot community. Difficulty of implementation was made
particularly clear in the September 10, 1964, report of the SecretaryGeneral after the Force had been operational almost six months. After
referring to the explicit guaranty of freedom of movement in the
agreement, the Secretary-General said: "But the Force has encountered
many difficulties in this regard which have greatly hindered its work.
In particular, during July and early August there were frequent cases
of serious restriction of the movement of UNFICYP by the Cypriot
police and the Cyprus National guard."0' 9 The report then gave particular details which revealed the underlying cause of the difficulties.
One of UNFICYP's principal objectives was "to prevent a recurrence
of fighting .... -70 To that end it maintained constant patrols designed
to discourage the importation of arms and the building of fortified
positions. Yet, according to the report, "precisely at the time when it
was believed that large shipments of military equipment were being
unloaded from Greek ships, serious restrictions were imposed on the
movement of UNFICYP personnel and vehicles at and near the Limas71
sol docks."
This was not an isolated incident. In general, "the Government of
Cyprus maintained that the entry by UNFICYP into docks and ports
or other Government premises, or the stationing of units therein, was
not included in the term 'freedom of movement'. ' 72 In personal negotiations, the President of Cyprus seemed to qualify this position somewhat by suggesting that "UNFICYP would enjoy complete freedom
of movement throughout the territory of the Republic, although, for
security reasons, certain sensitive areas could not be visited by ordinary UNFICYP patrols." 73 In practice, however, this general assurance
appeared to mean that there were to be certain areas "of special importance to the Cyprus Government which may not be visited by
anyone in UNFICYP"; other areas "which may be visited only by the
Force Commander having given due notice to the Cyprus military
authorities," and still other areas "which may be visited only by senior
UNFICYP officers having given due warning and even then only at
predetermined days and hours." 74 At the same time, the Force was
69 U.N. Doc. No. S/5950, para. 14 (1964).
70 Id. para. 6.
71 Id. para. 15.
72 Id. para. 16.
73 Id. para. 18.
74 Ibid.
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also experiencing some difficulty in areas controlled by Turkish
Cypriots, particularly in the immediate vicinity of fortified posts, but
these obstacles were apparently yielding to local negotiation. 5
In his Report of December 12, 1964, the Secretary-General acknowledged that the freedom of movement of the U.N. Force had continued,
during the preceding three months, to meet with interference both
from the Government of Cyprus side and, less significantly, from the
Turkish Cypriot side.7 6 The government had continued to insist that
certain, areas were out of bounds to all members of the Force and a
considerably larger number of areas could be visited only by the Force
Commander. After further protests from the Force Commander, an
agreement had been reached, on November 10, 1964, reflecting a
studied compromise between UNFICYP's insistence upon its freedom
of movement and the government's insistence upon the secrecy of its
military installations. The agreement provided that the whole of the
island was to be free to UNFICYP with the exception of certain stipulated areas which could be visited only by the Force Commander after
consultation with the Greek Cypriot commander and certain other
stipulated areas which could be inspected by UNFICYP zone or district commanders, not below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, if prior
notice was given to the local National Guard commander. In addition,
a solution had been worked out with respect to the restrictions which
had been experienced "whenever UNFICYP patrols sought to carry
out their duty of observing the unloading of military equipment and
stores at the docks." The solution was that "the local authorities
would inform the headquarters of UNFICYP Limassol District whenever a shipment of stores was expected at the harbor. The UNFICYP
District Headquarters in turn would arrange for the New Zealand
civilian police section stationed in the District to be present at the
docks at the time of unloading." The report adds, perhaps with a
touch of irony: "[Buy and large this agreement has worked satisfactorily
whenever advance notification has been forthcoming as had been
77
agreed upon, which was usually the case."
The Secretary-General's Report of March 11, 1965, reflected new developments in the conflict between UNFICYP's freedom of movement
and the asserted claims of secrecy of military installations." As a result
of a disagreement between the UNFICYP Commander and the Na75 Id. para. 19.

76 Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, U.N.
Doc. No. S/6102, paras. 125-30 (1964).
77 Ibid.

78 U.N. Doc. No. S/6228, paras. 19-28 (1965).
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tional Guard commander as to whether the agreement on restricted
areas applied to vehicles and personnel on the ground only or to overflights as well, UNFICYP light aircraft flying reconnaissance duty over
restricted areas had been fired upon by government troops. Turkish
Cypriot armed forces had also begun to bar UNFICYP patrols from
entering what the Turkish Cypriot leadership regarded as sensitive
areas. This interference from both sides obviously raised fundamental
questions with regard to the whole purpose supposed to be served by
UNFICYP patrolling. The U.N. Force Commander suggested that
"the aim of reconnaissance by UNFICYP was to keep him properly
informed, so as to enable him to assess likely future military developments, and so position the Force correctly for its task of keeping the
peace." 79 Nevertheless, the Force Commander ordered a review of
UNFICYP reconnaissance procedures "with a view to reducing to a
minimum practices which might conceivably give rise to friction or
resentment, however unjustified."80 In reply the Minister of Interior
of the Government of Cyprus informed the Force Commander that "if
the revised procedures were followed, there would be no intention
on the part of the Cyprus security forces to interfere with United Nations operations on the Island, but the security forces expected UNFICYP not to interfere with their own functions .... The Government

of Cyprus was facing a threat from outside [presumably invasion from
Turkey], and considered that UNFICYP had no valid interest in activities designed to meet that threat."8 ' The Secretary-General's report does not reveal how the revised procedures differed from the
previous ones, but assures us that they "do not diminish the ability of
UNFICYP to keep the Commander properly informed of developments in the Island.

82

The Secretary-General's Report of June 10, 1965,83 indicates that
the revised procedures led to a considerable decrease in unpleasant incidents involving U.N. Forces and the National Guard; difficulties with
the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, showed an opposite tendency.
The Secretary-General noted that the increased militancy and aggressiveness of the Turkish fighter elements, which caused the difficulties,
"coincided with public criticism, both in Turkey and among Turkish
Cypriots, of the report of the United Nations Mediator and of the work
79 Id. para. 25.
80 Id. para. 26.
81 Id. para. 27.
82 Id. para. 26.
83 Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, U.N.
Doc. No. S/6426, paras. 18-21 (1965).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 33:249

of UNFICYP." 84 For a while the Turkish Cypriot leaders denied
UNFICYP's right to inspect closed and shuttered shops along streets in
Nicosia constituting the so-called "green line," established by the
British before the creation of UNFICYP for the purpose of separating
the embattled Turkish and Greek communities. After rather protracted
negotiations the Turkish Cypriot leadership finally accepted "the unrestricted and unconditional rights of access and inspection of the
United Nations Force (subject to reasonable notice in case of residential premises) in connection with UNFICYP's function of preventing a
recurrence of fighting."85
These disagreements between UNFICYP, on the one hand, and the
Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots, on the other, with respect to the
exact application of the principle of freedom of movement, suggest,
just as did the experience in the Congo, that the principle cannot in
realistic terms be divorced from the fundamental objectives of the
U.N. operation. In his Report of April 29, 1964, the Secretary-General
summarized the general objectives of the U.N. Force as defined by the
Security Council to be:
(a) To prevent a recurrence of fighting.
(b) To contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law
and order.
(c) To contribute to a return to normal conditions.8 6
As more specific objectives to serve as a program of action designed
to accomplish the general mandate, the Secretary-General listed the
following steps, among others: achievement of freedom of movement
for all the communities on all roads in Cyprus and within the whole
town of Nicosia and other cities, under conditions of security; progressive evacuation of and removal of fortified positions held by Greek and
Turkish Cypriots; progressive disarming of all civilians other than the
regular police gendarmerie and the Cyprus Army by the Cypriot Government and the Turkish community, with UNFICYP assisting in
facilitating and verifying the disarming and the storage of arms in
security, if requested to do so.8 7 The relation of UNFICYP's freedom
of movement to the accomplishment of these objectives is reasonably
clear. The Force could hardly assure freedom of movement to the
communities of Cyprus, in security, if it could not maintain it for itself.
Neither could it assure the evacuation and removal of fortified posi84 Id. para. 20.
85 Id. para. 69.
86 Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Operations of the
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, U.N. Doe. No. S/5671, Annex I, para. 1
(1964).
87 Id. para. 2.
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tions if it could not inspect such positions with uninhibited frequency
and intensity. But presumably the desired freedom of movement of the
civilian population did not apply to the military installations of the
National Guard; nor did the term fortifications apply to such installations. Just what the test of "sensitive area" as propounded by the Government of Cyprus was we are not told by the U.N. reports. Whether
it was limited to installations of the National Guard is left to speculation. Even if it were so limited, we are left to wonder whether the recognition of these sensitive areas meant in effect that fortifications
designed for the protection of the Turkish community were subject to
intensive inspection, while those designed for protection of the Greek
Cypriot community could be watched only from afar or by occasional
specially arranged visits of the Force Commander. If this was the effect,
it is not surprising that the Turkish community responded by establishing its own sensitive areas.
Another objective of UNFICYP patrolling, as indicated in the Secretary-General's reports, was to keep the Force Commander informed
of the general conditions in the country. Among those conditions was
the general balance of forces. In his Report of June 15, 1964, the Secretary-General said:
The problem of arms in Cyprus is critical. Indeed it may
be the decisive factor in determining the ability of the United
Nations effort in Cyprus to succeed. There is no question, of
course, that the smuggling of arms, whether by Turkish or
Greek Cypriots, is illegal and that UNFICYP is entitled to
try to check it. It would seem also not subject to question that
a sovereign Government normally is entitled to import
and/or manufacture arms. With regard to Cyprus, the question is whether at the present time and in the present circumstances, the import and manufacture of arms by the Government of Cyprus is within the letter and/or spirit of the
Security Council resolution of 4 March. 8
This question posed by the Secretary-General was never explicitly
answered. The Government of Cyprus insisted upon its right to import arms, and also the necessity for doing so, in view of the threat of
invasion by Turkey; it suggested, however, that the type of arms
sought were suitable for this purpose only, rather than for use against
the Turkish Cypriot community. Presumably this disagreement between the Secretary-General and the Government of Cyprus regarding
88 Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the United Nations
Operation in Cyprus, for the period 26 April to 8 June 1964, U.N. Doc. No. S/5764, para.

120 (1964).
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the importation of arms underlay the difficulties experienced by ONUC
in exercising its right to freedom of movement in the neighborhood
of the Limassol docks. We are never told explicitly by the reports just
what purpose the U.N. inspection of the docks served and exactly how
that purpose was served by the limited inspection finally permitted.
In a "general assessment of the situation with regard to preventing recurrence of fighting," the Secretary-General, in his report of March 11,
1965, did say: "Although UNFICYP has been impeded from time to
time in its efforts, particularly by governmental forces with regard to
essential freedom of movement, it has, by its deployment in likely
trouble spots and by its continuous observation of military movement
on the Island, endeavored at all times to ensure that no large-scale
preparations for an attack by one side or the other would escape its
notice."8 9 On the basis of these somewhat limited observations, the Secretary-General ventured the conclusion that there was thus far no specific evidence either of "preparations for a large-scale attack on the
Turkish Cypriot Community" or of "preparations for offensive action
by the Turkish Cypriots."9 0 Nevertheless, the report concludes on the
point that, because "preparations for a possible resumption of intercommunal hostilities will become more and more difficult to detect," it
is "vital that UNFICYP's rights in respect of free movement and observations, both on the ground and from the air, shall continue to be
recognized to enable the Security Council to be kept informed about
the situation and to dispel unwarranted apprehensions.""'
The principal question with respect to "freedom of movement" suggested by the Congo experience, and by the Cyprus experience thus
far, is not whether it is an important right which should be generally
insisted upon in U.N. peace-keeping operations. Its importance seems
to be overwhelmingly demonstrated in both instances. The more legitimate question is whether experience suggests that the general affirmation of the right, in the terms included in both Status of Forces
agreements, is sufficiently realistic. In the Congo effective freedom of
movement for ONUC necessarily included effective control of key
transportation centers, even if, in that respect, it carried at least a
potential threat to the freedom of movement of other forces. In Cyprus
complete freedom of movement for UNFICYP came into conflict with
the government's asserted right to create and keep substantially secret
its own military installations supposedly designed for defense against
89 Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, U.N.
Doe. No. S/6228, para. 63 (1965).
0 Id. para. 64.
91 Id. para. 65.
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external attack. Conceivably in future agreements it might be possible
to guard against such possible points of tension by more specific provisions. Failing such a solution perhaps the most that can be said by
way of generalization is that recognition of the right to "freedom of
movement" in the broadest possible terms is an extremely convenient
handle for the Secretary-General or the Force Commander to be able
to grasp in delicate negotiations over specific problems, as demonstrated so often in both the Congo and Cyprus, even if such freedom
may sometimes have to be limited by what the host country regards as
its own requirements of national defense or maintenance of internal
order. Finally, in the event of an impasse in negotiations, there is always the possibility of returning to the Security Council or the General
Assembly, as the case may be, for clarification or modification of the
mandate, or even of recommending termination of the operation on
account of failure of the host government to cooperate in "good faith"
in accordance with the terms of its original commitment.

III.

THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

The problem of freedom of movement has been closely associated
in actual practice with the limitation upon the use of force to the
right of self-defense; frequently they have been opposite sides of the
same coin. Put most bluntly, the hard question is whether a U.N. peacekeeping force is ever entitled to take the initiative in the use of force
in order to effectuate its right to freedom of movement. It will be recalled that Hammarskjold, faced with just this question in connection
with the original entry into Katanga, shrank from any such use of
force without specific authorization from the Security Council and
even recommended against such an authorization. 2 In so doing he was
being faithful to his own precepts as developed in the Summary Study,
in which he said:
A reasonable definition seems to have been established in
the case of UNEF, where the rule is applied that men engaged
in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of
armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an
attack with arms, including attempts to use force to make
them withdraw from positions which they occupy under orders
from the Commander, acting under the authority of the As92 It might even be said that Hammarskjold refused in this instance to commit U.N.
troops to an operation in which he had good reason to believe that they would have to
use arms in self-defense once the operation was launched. It is not clear, however, that
the Secretary-General saw the situation in that light or meant to carry his principle of
self-restraint quite that far.
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sembly and within the scope of its resolutions. The basic element involved is clearly the prohibition against any initiative
in the use of armed force.9 3
This formulation of the governing principle does not explicitly answer the question whether troops may use armed force if necessary to
assume positions which they are ordered to occupy in order to carry
out their mandate under the governing resolutions. But the implication of the statement-particularly in its emphasis upon "the prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed force"-appears to be
clearly in the negative. It is also significant that the statement was
repeated, with the same emphasis, in the Secretary-General's First
Report on the operation in the Congo. 9 4 The application of the principle is not limited to vindication of the right to freedom of movement; rather it embraces all the operations of the Force. Consequently
the general question presented by this formulation of the principle
might be stated as: What is a U.N. peace-keeping force supposed to do if
it meets with passive but effective resistance or evasion while attempting to perform its authorized functions?
This question has never been critical in the operations of UNEF;
indeed in this respect, UNEF seems to have led a rather charmed life.
This may have been partly due to the alacrity with which Nasser moved
into the Gaza strip, upon the heels of UNEF, with his own administrative governor, staff officers, and military police, thus relieving U.N.
troops of any further responsibility for the maintenance of internal
order.95 Since then the functions of UNEF have been limited to patrolling the armistice lines and the shores of the Straits of Tiran and
the Gulf of Aqaba. In the performance of its duties "UNEF is authorized to apprehend infiltrators and persons approaching the demarcation line in suspicious circumstances .... [A]fter interrogation,
the persons apprehended are handed over to the local police." 96 To
accomplish these purposes, apart from one bloodless exchange of fire
93 Summary Study, para. 179.
94 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 20 (S/4389)
(1960).
95 UNEF did have responsibility for the maintenance of internal order within the strip
during the first few days after the Israeli withdrawal. A preview of the kind of troubles it
might have experienced if this responsibility had continued was provided by one incident
during these first few days, when a group of rioters surrounded the U.N. headquarters
and attempted to raise the Egyptian flag. UNEF soldiers succeeded in dispersing the
rioters by using tear gas and firing over their heads. However, one of the demonstrators was
killed by a ricochetting bullet. Apparently this is the only fatality inflicted by UNEF.
See ROSNER, THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORcE 87-92 (1963); Armstrong, The U.N.
Experience in Gaza, 35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 600, 616 (1957).
96 Summary Study, para. 70.
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with an Israeli patrol97 which was based apparently upon a misunderstanding, the Force has never had occasion to use its arms seriously, at
least so far as the reports show. The periodic reports do show a number of incidents involving firing across the armistice demarcation line,
crossing it, and occasional thefts and even kidnappings incidental to
such crossings, but they do not tell us just how UNEF has reacted when
faced with such incidents.9 8 It apparently relies upon vigorous patrolling, intensive observation, and occasional warning shots to keep them
from getting out of hand.
The experience in the Congo presented quite a different story from
that of UNEF in respect to the difficulties encountered in applying the
principle of never taking the initiative in the use of armed force. The
first explicit testing of the principle developed in an exchange of
messages between the Secretary-General and the President of Ghana,
dated August 18 and 19, 1960, growing out of an incident at the Leopoldville airport, involving Ghanaian officers and soldiers of ONUC,
U.N. security people, and armed members of the Force publique (later
called the ANC-Armee Nationale Congolaise). 9 The exact facts of
op. cit. supra note 95, at 248 n.113.
98 See U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 18th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 19, at 4 (A/5494)
(1963); U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 17th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 32, at 4 (A/5172)
(1962); U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 16th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 26, at 24 (A/4857)
(1961); U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rc. 15th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 27, at 17 (A/4486)
(1960); U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 14th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 28, at 25
(A/4210) (1959); U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rc. 13th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 65, at 6
(A/3899) (1958); U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rac. 12th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 65, at 6
(A/3694) (1957).
The Secretary-General apparently still regards the authority of UNEF to use some
measure of force or show of force to stop incidents as essential to the success of its operations. In the recent Survey of the United Nations Emergency Force, U.N. Doc. No.
A/C.5/1049, paras. 36-37, at 16 (1965), the Survey Team, after mentioning the possibility
of substituting more air observation for ground patrols, concluded: "In considering such
possibilities, which are at first sight attractive from the point of view of economy, it is
necessary to bear in mind the experience of the United Nations with other observation
missions . . . . The nature of these missions gives them no responsibility for actually
preventing incidents and violations . . . . Furthermore, the effectiveness of an observer
operation requires the presence of observers on both sides of the Line and the observance
of a demilitarized zone along the Line by both sides. These considerations have caused the
Survey Team to consider that a predominantly observer operation would be inadequate to
the fulfillment of the mandate of UNEF at the present time." On this point Rosner makes
this comment: "United Nations soldiers possess the right to fire in self-defense-a right
which, on occasion, has been used-but the question whether they have authority to fire
during darkness at infiltrators approaching the line from either direction is still undetermined. Effective prevention of infiltration across the frontiers would seem to necessitate
the right to shoot at marauders, and indeed General Burns requested this right. But only
authority to shoot in self-defense was granted by the Secretary-General and the Advisory
Committee, though it was understood that self-defense would be broadly interpreted."
RosNaR, op. cit. supra note 95, at 102.
99 U.N. SECURrrY COUNCIL. OFF. REC. 15th )ear, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 99-102 (S/4445),
109 (S/4449), 118-15 (S/4451) (1960).
97 ROSNER,
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the incident do not appear clearly from the documents; apparently
soldiers of the Force publique seized, imprisoned, and to some extent
abused U.N. civilian personnel in the presence of the Ghanaian guard
who did not immediately secure their release. 100 Complaints about
this failure, transmitted to the President of Ghana, elicited an answering blast from Major-General H. T. Alexander, Chief of the Defense
Staff of Ghana. General Alexander asserted that the failure of the
Ghanaian guard to act immediately and effectively was due entirely
to the kind of general orders issued by the U.N. Command. "To say the
least of it," said the General, "these orders were neither clear nor did
they give United Nations troops any liberty of action even for the use
of minimum force. In fact, when specifically asked whether force
could be used to release United Nations personnel, Colonel Beru0
thiaume, military aide to the Supreme Commander, answered 'No'."'
Mr. Ralph J. Bunche, then special representative of the SecretaryGeneral in the Congo, said in reply to General Alexander: "The
United Nations Command has issued orders to its troops which are
very clear on the subject of the employment of force. The operations
directive, familiar to everyone associated with the Force, states, under
the heading 'Use of arms': 'At all levels, commanders are to be instructed to the effect that, on no account, are weapons to be used
unless in cases of great and sudden emergency and for the purposes
of self-defence. In such cases, the commander on the spot will ensure
that the greatest care and control are used.' "102 Mr. Bunche also made
a spirited defense of this policy, saying, in part: "Obviously, if the
Force began to use its arms to wound and kill Congolese its doom
would be quickly sealed, for it cannot long survive amidst a hostile
public. Indeed, this would defeat its very purpose. I think it not the
least exaggeration to say that the Force gained very much in the way
of prestige and moral superiority by the remarkable restraint it dis03
played, under severe provocation earlier this week."'
It is a curious aspect of the Alexander-Bunche exchange that while
it arose out of criticism by the Secretariat of U.N. soldiers for not having
taken more initiative in protecting U.N. personnel, it ended with Alexander urging a more aggressive policy and Bunche a policy of continued self-restraint. We are never told just what Bunche thought the
Ghanaian soldiers should have done to protect or secure the release
BuRNs & HEATHCOTE, PEACE-KEEPING BY U.N. FORCEs 41-42 (1963).
101 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 101-02 (S/4445)

100

(1960).
Id. at 113-14 (S/4451) (1960).
1031d. at 115.
102
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of the U.N. personnel. However, he does mention in passing that U.N.
soldiers had been permitted to fire in self-defense when attacked while
escorting Congolese civilians. 0 4 Presumably the same right would
apply if they had been attacked while undertaking to protect U.N. personnel. But this did not quite answer the question of what U.N. troops
could do to release personnel already apprehended. General Alexander's solution was to take the initiative by disarming potential troublemakers-in this case the undisciplined or unreliable units of the
Force publique-apparently using such force as might be required for
the purpose.10 5 The difficulty with this proposal, according to Mr.
Bunche, was that it was plainly not authorized by the Security Council
resolution directing the Secretary-General "'to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until . . .the

national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Govern.In the light of this resolution,"
ment, to meet fully their tasks' ....
he said, "our policy in the Congo has been one of seeking to co-operate
with the Government and this, admittedly, has not been without
difficulties."100
These difficulties were compounded when ONUC was faced with
feuding local armed forces, loyal to different leaders, some of whom
were demanding U.N. assistance or protection. The Hammarskjold
principle of neutrality in internal conflicts did not go so far as to bar
protection of local leaders against violence in this situation. But again
the problem was how much initiative ONUC could take in affording
such protection. Thus, in response to criticism from the President of
the Republic, Kasavubu, for not having protected loyal officials of
the provincial government of Kivu from arrest and kidnapping by
the rebel followers of Gizenga and Lundula, the representative of the
Secretary-General reported that the ONUC Commander on the spot
had been told by the officials mentioned that ONUC assistance or
protection was not desired; that protection had been afforded to other
officials who did request it; and that once the arrest had been made of
persons not under U.N. protection at the time, "ONUC could not pur104 Id. at 113.
105 General Alexander did say that "everything should be done to persuade the Cabinet
of the Congo Republic to co-operate in action taken to retrain and reform this army," but
he added, "whether or not co-operation can be obtained, the United Nations must do its
duty." Id. at 101 (S/4445) (1960).
106 Id. at 114 (S/4451) (1960). General Alexander has since repeated and elaborated his
criticisms of the U.N. military operation in the Congo, particularly the need for more
realistic and explicit military directives, and the desirability of greater delegation of authority to field commanders. He also recognizes, however, the tremendous political difficulties involved and the many accomplishments of U.N. forces and personnel. ALEXANDER,
AFRICAN TIGHTROPE 61-87 (1965).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 33:249

sue and join battle with an ANC unit. That would have constituted
a military initiative and an act of intervention, both of which are forbidden by the mandate of the force as laid down by the Security Council."'u0

This incident together with the explanation of the Secretary-

General's representative seems to show an area where the prohibition
of any initiative in the use of force worked sensibly and clearly to
establish a consistent pattern of conduct. It is not so clear, however,
that exactly the same rules should have been applicable to protection
of U.N. personnel as to feuding Congolese leaders. It would seem not
unreasonable for the United Nations to have reserved to itself the
right to take the initiative, by force if necessary, to secure the release
of U.N. personnel, at least where their detention was not based upon a
formal order of arrest from a recognized governmental authority. This
was indeed the position subsequently adopted. 08
As might well be expected in the light of the preceding discussion
of freedom of movement, the self-defense limitation received its hardest test in the operations of ONUC in Katanga. This first occurred not
so much in connection with the secession of Katanga, but as a consequence of the determination of Tshombe to stamp out what he regarded as rebellion against his authority in northern Katanga, namely
the disaffection of the Balubas, many of whom were seeking ONUC's
protection. By this time ONUC was operating under the additional
authority granted by the Security Council resolution of February 21,
1961, which contained in its first operative paragraph this language:
"Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including
arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the
prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last
resort."'10 9 With this language of the resolution in mind, "the Force
commander instructed the commander of the UN troops in north
Katanga to oppose and resist any further aggressive moves by the
Katanga gendarmerie" and also "warned Mr. Tshombe that the United
Nations would oppose and resist any use by him of military force, and
that if clashes developed between Katanga forces and the United
Nations forces, the United Nations would send sufficient reinforcements to Katanga to deal with the situation."" 0 This order and warn107 U.N. SECURITY
(1961).
108 See U.N. Doc.
109 U.N. SECURrrY
(1961).
110 U.N. SECURITY
(1961).

COUNCIL OFF. REC. 16th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1961, at 45-46

(S/4630)

No. S/5653, para. 18 (1964); see also note 140 infra.
COUNCIL OFF. REc. 16th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1961, at 147 (S/4741)
COUNCIL OFF. RiC. 16th year, Supp. April-June 1961, at 24 (S/4791)
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ing were only partially implemented. At Manono, one of Tshombe's
objectives in north Katanga, Katangese gendarmes successfully
avoided contact with ONUC patrols, joined battle with and defeated
ANC/Jeuness in the neighborhood, seized control of the airport, and
prevented ONUC planes from landing there. At Kabalo, another one
of the objectives, on the other hand, ONUC retained control of the
airport, disarmed Katangese gendarmes attempting to land there, and
successfully repelled, after suffering some casualties, another group of
gendarmes attempting to land at the port of Kabalo. The total effect
apparently was that ONUC succeeded in retaining control of Kabalo
and providing protection for Baluba refugees in the immediate neighborhood; in other areas of north Katanga, Tshombe's forces more or
less successfully carried out his policy of forcible pacification.", So far
as appears from the official record, in no particular instance did ONUC
fire first. In any event, the effect of the general instructions with respect to the use of force in this situation is very difficult to assess.
It has been suggested that there was a substantial division of opinion
among U.N. officers as to just what the U.N. forces were supposed to
do; that "the attitude of UN forces at Kabalo in early April was quite
different from that of UN forces at Manono in late March."" 2 At this
point perhaps general instructions with respect to initiative in the
use of force had become irrelevant; what was required were more
3
specific directions regarding the objectives to be served."
The Resolution of February 21, 1961, contained another mandate
whose accomplishment promised to be difficult without further qualification of the principle limiting the exercise of force to self-defense.
It urged that "measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and
evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military
and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United
Nations Command, and mercenaries."

1 14

The resolution did not say

explicitly that this was to be the job of the United Nations; neither
did it explicitly authorize the use of force. Nevertheless, the officials
of the Secretariat seemed to be satisfied that both terms were implied,
if necessary. They hoped, of course, to achieve the announced objectives through negotiation and voluntary action. To this end, elaborate
negotiations were conducted with the Belgian government, the offi111 See O'BpUEN, To KATANCA AND BACK 140-56 (1962).

112 Id. at 146 n.1.
113 There were also in effect at this time somewhat more liberal directives with respect
to the use of force. See HOSKYNS, THE CONGO SINCE INDEPENDENCE 294-95 (1965).

114 U.N.
(1961).

SECURITY COUNCIL OFF.

REC. 16th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1961, at 147 (S/4741)
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cials of the Central Government, and the Katangese leaders. 115 Lists
of foreign military personnel and political advisers who were to be
evacuated were drawn up and to some extent agreed upon by all concerned, except, of course, the individuals themselves. Actual accomplishment of the evacuation proved a harder nut to crack. Months
passed without any substantial progress in this direction. In the meanwhile, pressure was building up in New York from a significant number
of member nations (the Soviet bloc and the Afro-Asians) for more
effective implementation of the resolution. 116
Decisive action was finally initiated towards the end of August 1961.
The Central Government at Leopoldville enacted an ordinance providing for the expulsion of all non-Congolese officers and mercenaries
serving in the Katangese forces, not under contract with the Central
Government. The Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo then
requested the assistance of the United Nations in the execution of
the ordinance. In pursuance to this request, the U.N. forces in Katanga
scored their first notable success, "Operation Rumpunch." Profiting
by surprise, they took over without resistance temporary control of
the post office and radio station in Elisabethville, blockaded key
Katangese officials in their homes, and arrested a substantial number
of foreign military personnel marked for evacuation." 7 After the
apparent success of the first bloodless strike, further negotiations followed in which the Belgian consulate and the Tshombe government
promised to cooperate in the repatriation of the remaining foreign
military personnel and political advisers. Unfortunately, these arrangements did not work out as anticipated by U.N. officers on the spot. For a
variety of reasons, a large number of the foreign personnel whose
evacuation was anticipated escaped apprehension, sentiment against
the U.N. operation in Katanga was again being whipped up to a fever
pitch, and hope for peaceful reconciliation between Katanga and the
Central Government seemed to wane." 8
Under these circumstances the leaders of the Central Government
in Leopoldville and the U.N. officers in charge at Leopoldville decided
upon another venture in force to bring the situation under control.
115 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 16th year, Supp. April-June 1961, at 43 (S/4807)
(1961).
116 HOSKYNS, op. cit. supra note 113, at 401.
117 O'BIaEN, op. cit. supra note 111, at 195-218; U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 16th
year, Supp. July-Sept. 1961, at 99 (S/4940) (1961). Of those listed for evacuation, 273 were
repatriated, 65 were waiting repatriation and 104 were missing, according to a U.N. recapitulation as of September 8, 1961, eleven days after the operation was launched. Id.
Annex III, at 106 (S/4940) (1961).
118 HOSKYNS, op. cit. supra note 113, at 413-17.
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The official and personal versions of exactly what was intended and
authorized as the objectives of the operations which followed still
differ materially. For present purposes suffice it to say that the Central
Government in Leopoldville issued warrants for the apprehension of
Tshombe and other leading officials of the government of Katanga.119
The U.N. representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise O'Brien, unquestionably thought he was authorized to use ONUC to help the Central
Government put those warrants into effect and thus bring an end to the
secession of Katanga. In order to accomplish these objectives U.N. forces
again moved to seize control of the strategic centers of Elisabethville,
such as the post office and radio station, and to blockade the Katangese
ministers in their homes. Unfortunately this operation, called "Morthor," was not as bloodless or as successful as the previous venture in
force, Rumpunch, with its more limited objectives. The post office and
radio station were captured, but only after significant casualties on
both sides. Only one of the Kantagese ministers marked for arrest
was in fact captured. Tshombe and his principal lieutenant, Munongo,
regarded by some as the sinister lion under the throne, escaped apprehension and eventually made clear their intentions to continue resistance. 120 The combination of failure to attain the major objectives of
the operation and violent criticism in some quarters of the use of
ONUC for "offensive operations" threw the U.N. high command into
considerable confusion and dismay. 12 1 This was increased rather than

alleviated by a statement attributed to Mr. O'Brien to the effect that
the United Nations was taking action to prevent civil war and that the
secession of Katanga was now over. 122 Hammarskjold, who had himself
arrived in Leopoldville just after the operation was launched, undertook
to resolve the situation first, by releasing an official report 2 3 which explained that objectives of U.N. forces in Katanga had been simply to
secure their own positions from attack and to continue the evacuation of foreign personnel, in accordance with part of paragraph two
of the Security Council's resolution, and second, by arranging for a
119 O'BRtmN, op. cit. supra note 111, at 247-49.
120 Id. at 253-58.
121 HOSKYNS, op. cit. supra note 113, at 420-28.
122 O'Brien made this statement at a time when the operation seemed to be going
relatively well. He referred to paragraph A.1 of the Resolution of February 21, 1961, in
which the Security Council "urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate
measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for
cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of
force, if necessary, in the last resort." U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 16th year, Supp.
Jan.-March 1961, at 147 (S/4741) (1961).
123 U.N. SEcu-rrY CoUNcIL OFF. Rac. 16th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1961, at 99 (S/4940)
(1961). See especially id. paras. 14-15, at 102-03.
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personal meeting with Tshombe in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia. The
124
meeting never occurred because of Hammarskjold's death.
Whether the objectives of the U.N. operations launched on September 13, 1961, (Morthor) were to secure the U.N. positions and to complete the evacuation of foreign personnel, as officially explained, rather
than to arrest Katanga's president and principal ministers and thus to
terminate the secession of Katanga, as Mr. O'Brien understood it,
is immaterial, so far as the principle of limiting the use of force to
self-defense is concerned. As the situation actually developed it soon
became apparent that neither of the assumed major objectives, the
evacuation of foreign personnel or the termination of secession, could
be achieved without overcoming considerable resistance from the
Katangese armed forces. 125 In other words, it seems hardly disputable
that ONUC could not have achieved either of the objectives at issue
by limiting its actions to self-defense in any usually accepted meaning
of that term. It could conceivably act, and in large part did act, upon
the principle that in no circumstance, however trying, would U.N.
soldiers fire the first shot. This meant that in attempting to achieve
specific objectives, whether it was taking control of an airport, a post
office or radio station, or apprehending foreign mercenaries, ONUC
personnel endured considerable additional risk that might have been
avoided if they had been under less restrictive orders regarding withholding their own fire. Indeed, the reports of the Congo operations
as a whole seem to indicate that most of ONUC casualties were suffered
while enduring hostile fire with exceptional self-restraint, rather than
in the course of striking back.126 Whether this is an additional risk
124 In the preparatory exchanges for that meeting, Hammarskjold continued to insist
that the declared objectives of Tshombe himself and the United Nations were identical,
namely, a peaceful reconciliation between the Central Government and Katanga, "within
the framework of the constitution of the Republic .... " Mr. Hammarskjold also pointed
out that if Mr. Tshombe would order a cease-fire, then "the cease-fire will occur automatically on the United Nations side, in view of the fact that according to the instructions
given and the rules followed by the Organization, it only opens fire in self-defence."
Id. at 99, 111-12 (S/4940/Add. 4).
125 It should be noted, in this connection, however, that Miss Hoskyns suggests that if
it had been dearly stated at the outset of Morthor that the objective was only to expel the
mercenaries and that the Katangese ministers were being blockaded rather than arrested,
the operation might well have been a success. Her reason for this suggestion is that "put
like this even the British Government would have had little legitimate ground for complaint and Hammarskjold would have had no need to cover up for what had been done."
HOSKYNS, OP. Cit. supra note 113, at 435. This analysis seems to underestimate Hammarskjold's basic commitment to avoid bloodshed and his probable unwillingness to continue full scale hostilities.
126 In this connection, it should be recalled that U.N. troops in the Congo suffered a
substantial number of serious casualties, including 126 killed in action. U.N. Doc. No.
S/5784, Annex III (1964).
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which U.N. forces engaged in peace-keeping operations should always be
asked to run, in order to live up to Mr. Bunche's distinction between
a "peace force" and a fighting force, is one of the most difficult ques' 7
tions presented by the "Hammarskjold principles."'
After the experience in the Congo, the Secretariat was of course
acutely conscious of the difficulties and dangers involved in sending
to Cyprus a U.N. Force charged with responsibility for keeping the
peace between two warring communities, and yet committed to the
principle of using force only in self-defense. The very first report of
the Secretary-General, issued only one month after UNFICYP had become operational, revealed sharply the horns of the dilemma which
the commanding general was supposed to avoid. The Secretary-General
said:
General Gyani, in pursuance of my instructions and, indeed,
in accordance with his own views, has consistently sought to
achieve the desired and defined objectives of the Force in
Cyprus by peaceful means, that is without resort to armed
force, the arms of the Force being carried only for clear purposes of self-defense. Despite concerted effort by General
Gyani and the Force, and my own earlier appeals, fighting
persists in Cyprus, with lives of Cypriots-Greek and Turk
alike-being needlessly and pointlessly sacrificed. I wish here
to emphasize my view that the United Nations Force was dispatched to Cyprus to try to save lives by preventing a recurrence of fighting. It would be incongruous, even a little
insane, for that Force to set about killing Cypriots, whether
Greek or Turkish, to prevent them from killing each other.
Yet, that is exactly the dilemma which is almost confronting
General Gyani in Cyprus today.
127 Considerations such as these were not entirely absent from the heated debates in
the Security Council which followed the operation of September 13th and the death of
Hammarskjold. For example, Krishna Menon, after mentioning the casualties suffered by
Indian troops, said: "[T]hese men were not allowed to use their machine guns or other
weapons, when they were being fired at when the Post Office was being held. They were
trying to persuade these people not to carry on militant action, and they were shot in
consequence." U.N. SEcuarrY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 16th year, 976th meeting 19-20 (S/PV. 976)
(1961). The Ethiopian representative expressed a similar opinion: "We must have a
balanced view. We cannot say to the troops: 'Do a certain job; do not undertake any
police action, and if they shoot at you, just take it and go home.' This point of view is
very distressing indeed." Id. at 38. On the other hand, the representative of Sweden said:
"The United Nations should attempt to keep order in the country and to prevent, if
possible, clashes between the forces of hostile parties. But the United Nations is not
charged with the task of participating in a real war, in a civil war. Neither the Charter
of the United Nations nor the declarations made at the start of the intervention entitle
the United Nations to such an extension of its role." U.N. SECURTY COUNCIL OFF. REC.
16th year, 974th meeting 17 (S/PV.974) (1961).
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On the other hand, the Force cannot stand idly by and see
an undeclared war deliberately pursued, or see innocent civilians of all ages ruthlessly struck down by snipers' bullets. 128
From the rest of the Secretary-General's report it appears that
the commanding General was in fact presented with the dilemma
described by the Secretary-General and attempted to meet it in the
first instance by personal negotiations rather than by use of forces
at his command. After noting the outbreak of serious fighting in
the Kyrenia Mountains, the report states: "There was no interposition
of the United Nations Force in this situation because the fighting
broke out unexpectedly and interposition under heavy fire would be
neither feasible nor helpful.' 29 This decision not to interpose was
presumably made in accordance with the general principles revealed
in an aide-memoire released by the Secretary-General on April 11,
1964, which stated: "In certain cases it may be possible to enforce a
cease fire by interposing UNFICYP military posts between those involved, but if this is not acceptable ... or if there is doubt about its
effectiveness, it should not normally be done, as it may only lead to a
direct clash between UNFICYP troops and those ... in ... conflict."'u 0
128 U.N. Doc. No. S/5671, paras. 5, 6 (1964).
129 Id. at para. 4.

130 U.N. Doc. No. S/5653, para. 21 (1964). The aide-menzoire deserves particular attendon since it spells out in far greater detail than ever before made public instructions governing the use of force. It includes, for example:
17. No action is to be taken by the troops of UNFICYP which is likely to bring
them into direct conflict with either community in Cyprus, except in the following
circumstances:
(a) where members of the Force are compelled to act in self-defense;
(b) where the safety of the Force or of members of it is in jeopardy;
(c) where specific arrangements accepted by both communities have been, or in
-the opinion of the commander on the spot are about to be, violated, thus
risking a recurrence of fighting or endangering law and order.
18. When acting in self-defense, the principle of minimum force shall always be
applied, and armed force will he used only when all peaceful means of persuasion
have failed. The decision as to when force may be used under these circumstances
rests with the commander on the spot whose main concern will be to distinguish
between an incident which does not require fire to be opened and those situations
in which troops may be authorized to use force. Examples in which troops may be
so authorized are:
(a) attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from a position which they
occupy under orders from their commanders or to infiltrate and envelop such
positions as are deemed necessary by their commanders to hold, thus jeopardizing
their safety;
(b) attempts by force to disarm them;
(c) attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities
as ordered by their commanders;
(d) violation by force of United Nations premises and attempts to arrest or
abduct United Nations personnel, civil or military.
19. Should it be necessary to resort to the use of arms, advance warning will be
given whenever possible. Automatic weapons are not to be used except in extreme
emergency, and fire will continue only as long as is necessary to achieve its immediate aim.
20. Whenever a threat of attack develops towards a particular area, commanders
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The Secretary-General's Report of June 15, 1964,131 mentioned
several incidents in which UNFICYP units engaged in normal patrols
or in escorting Cypriot civilians in dangerous areas were fired upon
and returned the fire. In one such incident a UNFICYP soldier was
killed. There had, however, been no resumption of large scale fighting
such as that which had occurred in April and this the report attributed
in part to "the location of permanent UNFICYP posts with the forward troops of both sides" and to the fact that "it has been made clear
to both sides that a repetition of such incidents will result in the
removal of any post used as a base for fire against troops of UNFICYP,
using force if necessary after due warning has been given."' 32 Similarly,
according to the Report of September 10, 1964, the timely interposition of UNFICYP troops between the two contending sides when
hostilities seemed imminent, but before they actually broke out, apparently succeeded in keeping the peace in some instances. 13 Unfortunately, this formula did not always work so well. This was particularly true of the large scale fighting which began on August 6 in the
Tylliria area with an attack by government forces upon Turkish
Cypriot positions suspected of arms smuggling and continued until
the Turkish Air Force intervened on August 8 and the Security Council called for a cease-fire on August 9.134 During the course of the
battle UNFICYP posts directly in the line of fire were withdrawn
because "it was apparent that they had no possibility of stopping the
battle by staying there . .. .,135
After the cease-fire went into effect additional UNFICYP posts were
established between the opposing sides; those were "intended not only
to observe breaches of the cease-fire, but also to give warning of any
will endeavour to restore peace to the area [and] . . .should approach the local
leaders of both communities. Mobile patrols shall immediately be organized to
manifest the presence of UNFICYP in the threatened and disturbed areas in whatever strength is available. All appropriate means will be used to promote calm
and restraint.
If all attempts at peaceful settlement fail, unit commanders may recommend to
their senior commander that UNIFCYP troops be deployed in such threatened
areas. On issue of specific instructions to that effect from UNFICYP headquarters,
unit commanders will announce that the entry of UNFICYP Force into such
areas will be effected, if necessary, in the interests of law and order.
If, despite these warnings, attempts are made to attack, envelop or infiltrate
UNFICYP positions, thus jeopardizing the safety of troops in the area, they wil
defend themselves and their positions by resisting and driving off the attackers
with minimum force.
Paragraph 18 is substantially similar to the revised instructions for ONUC as reported
by HosKYNS, op. cit. supra note 113, at 294-95.
131 U.N. Doc. No. S/5764, paras. 8-12 (1964).
132 Id. paras. 30-31.
133 U.N. Doc. No. S/5950, paras. 54-58 (1964).
134 Id. paras. 64-89.
135

Id. para. 79.
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aggressive moves by either side in sufficient time for UNFICYP to
take action to prevent a recurrence of fighting."' 136 These efforts were
continued and further developed, with apparently increasing success,
as described in the next three-month report of the Secretary-General:
During the period under review, the peace-keeping function
proper was almost identical with the function of supervising
the cease-fire, and included interposition, fixed posts and frequent patrols, intervention on the spot to prevent shooting
incidents from snowballing into serious fighting, and demarcation of cease-fire lines where appropriate. With the
institution of exclusive UNFICYP control over the NicosiaKyrenia roads on 26 October, 1964, functions in this connection were assumed and positions taken over by the United
18 7
Nations.
Subsequent reports of the Secretary-General for March 11, June 10,
and December 10, 1965,138 reflected a general satisfaction with the
maintenance of the cease-fire, despite the continuance of occasional
outbreaks of firing and the deliberate infliction upon UNFICYP of
ten casualties during the period covered by all three reports. In
general it seems fair to say that the various methods already described
of emphasizing the presence of UNFICYP, coupled with practically
continuous negotiation with local commanders in troubled areas and
with the top officials of the Government of Cyprus and the head of
the Turkish Cypriot community, succeeded at least in preserving, for
the most part, a precarious state of peace, without the actual use of
force by UNFICYP.
136 Id.

para. 90.

U.N. Doc. No. S/6102, para. 119 (1964). Even this period of relative calm was not
without its moments of dangerous confrontation. For example, in the course of marking
the front lines of both sides in the neighborhood of the Kokkina bridgehead, the area of
the heavy fighting of August 6, 1964, UNFICYP troops were several times obstructed in
their task. On one occasion, the occupants of a post refused to move out and adopted a
most belligerent attitude. The UNFICYP marking team was obliged to call for reinforcements which were quickly deployed. Fortunately, this show of force was sufficient to resolve
the argument." Id. para. 157.
138 U.N. Doc. Nos. S/6228, S/6426, S/7001 (1965). Even during these periods, there were,
however, some disappointing exceptions, especially the outbreak of hostilities in the
Lefka-Ambelikou area in March 1964, reported in the U.N. Doe. No. S/6228/Add.1 (1964),
and in the Famagusta area in November 1965, reported in U.N. Doc. Nos. S/6881 (1965),
S/6881/Adds. 1 & 2 (1965), S/7001 paras. 55-56 (1965). The latter incident apparently developed from the insistence of the government, over UNFICYP objections, upon building
fortifications immediately adjacent to Turkish Cypriot villages. There was also an outbreak
of firing in October 1965 between National Guard and Turkish Cypriot patrols, during
which a UNFICYP observation post was withdrawn in order to avoid casualties. U.N. Doe.
No. Sf7001, paras. 62-68 (1965).
'87
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The relative success of UNEF and UNFICYP, as compared with
ONUC, in accomplishing their objectives without inflicting casualties
upon anyone else or suffering any significant casualties themselves,
naturally raises the question whether this was due to the differences
in the situations in which the forces operated or to differences in the
way those situations were handled. Of course, the difference in the
tasks assigned is most noticeable in comparing UNEF with ONUC.
UNEF had a definite armistice line to patrol, with a commitment from
both sides to respect that line. Despite the various individual incidents
reported by the Secretary-General of violations of the line, marauding,
firing, stealing and the like, it appears that both governments have
generally adhered to that commitment. In the Congo the only two
recognized parties to the conflict were Belgium and the Republic
of the Congo. Although Belgium did not evacuate its troops as quickly
as the Secretary-General and some of the "anti-colonial nations" wished,
this delay did not seriously impede the effectuation of ONUC's mission. The serious difficulties came from the unrecognized parties, the
government of Katanga, the other secessionists, the feuding elements
of the Central Government, and the undisciplined elements of the
ANC. The lack of any basic agreement between these feuding elements,
plus the undisciplined armed forces and sheer size of the country,
presented ONUG with a task immeasurably more difficult than that
of either UNEF or UNFICYP. Added to this was the conflict of interest
among the Great Powers which constantly circumscribed the SecretaryGeneral's freedom of action and probably made it more difficult either
to take decisive action or to rely upon patient and painstaking negotiations.
Nevertheless, despite these basic differences between the situation
presented in the Congo, as compared with either Cyprus or the Middle
East, there were at least certain similarities between the Congo and
Cyprus operations in testing the principles of self-defense in actual
operation. In both situations the United Nations was concerned with
the maintenance of internal order; in both, in order to accomplish its
mission, the U.N. force had to demonstrate that at some point it was
prepared to use armed force. ONUC did this on a rather massive scale
only after it had been subjected to such harassment that self-defense, as
well as freedom of movement, was reasonably involved. Certainly this
was true in terms of the more liberalized definition of self-defense reflected in U Thant's subsequent aide-memoire.139 UNFICYP was never
subjected to such direct harassment, although it was occasionally the
139 See U.N. Doe. No. S/5653, para. 18 (1964), supra note 130.
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indirect recipient of fire apparently intended for the opposing side.
While in some such cases, it withdrew under fire, and generally avoided
interposing in the heat of battle, it apparently did not hesitate, once a
cease-fire had been obtained, to place itself in positions between the
contending parties directly in the line of fire in case of resumption
of hostilities and succeeded for the most part in at least giving the
impression that it was prepared to stand its ground. In patrolling the
roads entrusted to its care and in escorting civilians, it also was publicly
committed to the use of force, if necessary, in carrying out its responsibilities. Presumably a great deal of judgment and tact were exercised
in determining when to place the Force in such positions-perhaps
more so than was always exercised in the Congo.
In the light of these experiences, it might be said that self-defense
in the U.N. lexicon is a word of art with a variety of specialized meanings. In practical terms it means that U.N. troops should not shoot first
if they can possibly avoid it; they must be prepared to assume the
additional risk of being fired upon before resorting to arms. In a sense
they may have to court danger by placing themselves in positions where
they will in effect be forced to act in self-defense if there is any interference with the performance of their functions. It would seem to be a
necessary implication that force may also be used when necessary to
prevent an attack upon those who have properly committed themselves
to the protection of the United Nations. Unless the principle of limiting
force to self-defense be given some such elastic or Pickwickian meaning,
it might reduce the U.N. presence to the state of a useless and unhappy
bystander, whenever the unruly or opposing forces are sufficiently
sophisticated or simply lucky enough to avoid direct attack upon the
U.N. forces themselves.
It is probably fair to say that the above analysis of the use of force
is closer to U Thant's elaboration of the principles of self-defense
in the aide-memoire released for the purposes of UNFICYP than to
Hammarskjold's original analysis in the Summary Study of the experience derived from UNEF. For example, Hammarskjold said: "the basic
element involved is clearly the prohibition against any initiative in
the use of the armed force." U Thant, on the other hand, repeated the
same prohibition with respect to the "initiative in the use of armed
force," but also made public for the first time a more specific description of "those situations in which troops may be authorized to use
force," which included "attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders."' 40 The
140 This is not to say that this particular principle was developed for the first time by
U Thant rather than Hammarskjold, since it was apparently included in the revised
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key issue in applying this principle is likely to be not so much who
took the initiative in the use of force, as whether the "responsibilities
as ordered by their commanders" were properly within the general
mandate of the U.N. forces. Thus, in the exchange between Mr.
Bunche and Major General Alexander the basic disagreement seemed
to be whether it was properly one of the functions of ONUC to disarm ANC forces even without the consent of the Central Government. Whether Mr. Bunche's objections to such a course were primarily
practical or legal, or a mixture of both, the fundamental rationale
for disarming the ANC could not be found in deductions from the
principle of limiting the use of force to self-defense. Similarly, the only
justifiable distinction between the operation called Rumpunch, which
the Secretariat happily acknowledged, and Morthor, which it virtually
disowned, was that the first was designed to evacuate mercenaries,
and the second to terminate secession. As it turned out, nothing more
than a show of force was required for the first, while the second was
aborted when it became clear that it could not be accomplished without the actual use of force. Nevertheless, if either operation was really
within the mandate of the Force, it must follow that the "minimum
force" required for its effectuation would have been appropriate.
It should also be noted that Hammarskjold's original elaboration of
the principle of self-defense was related, in his view, to constitutional
limitations applicable to the type of authority being exercised. This
is made explicit in the Summary Study when he says: "The clear
delimitation of the right to use force which has been set out above
as a basic rule for the type of operation discussed in this report should
dissipate any objections to the suggested stand-by arrangements [earmarking troops for peace keeping] which would be based on the view
that they go beyond measures which the Charter permits the General
Assembly to take and infringe upon the prerogatives of the Security
Council.'1141 To the extent that there are constitutional considerations
instructions developed for ONUC, after the Resolution of February 21, 1961, when Hammarskjold was still Secretary-General. HOSKYNS, op. cit. supra note 113, at 294. This is
equally true of another example given in the aide-memoire of a situation justifying the use
of force: "Violation by force of United Nations premises and attempts to arrest or abduct
United Nations personnel, civil or military." This last would have clearly justified the use
of force in the situation at the Ndjili airport which sparked the Alexander-Bunche exchange.
141 Summary Study, para. 180. Hammarskjold also suggested that this analysis would put
UNEF constitutionally on the same level with UNOCIL, the United Nations Observer
Corps in Lebanon, even though that was created by the Security Council. This should not
obscure, however, the fact that UNEF was intended to be more than an observer corps,
that it did have certain enforcement powers, such as the power of apprehending suspicious
characters. Presumably this is what the Secretary-General meant by calling it a para-
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limiting the use of force, they probably apply as well to Security Council action outside of article 42, but such considerations would suggest
only that force should not be used against any state, or the responsible
officials of that state, to compel action which the government of that
state has not itself authorized. They hardly apply to the use of force
against unruly or dissident elements within the state. It also becomes
relevant to consider to what extent the original consent of the host
state to the introduction of the U.N. Force for the purposes of its mission implies consent to the use of force against any components of
the state resisting the accomplishment of the mission. These ramifications of the problem of consent were not presented in connection with
UNEF but they certainly were presented in the cases of ONUC and
UNFICYP. They are also indissolubly linked with the problems considered in the next section, regarding insulation of U.N. forces from
political conflict.
IV.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NEUTRALITY OR IMPARTIALITY WITH
REGARD TO POLITICAL CONFLICTS

In addition to the principles thus far considered, the Summary
Study suggested that a series of basic rules had been developed in
practice which "would appear to merit general application." 142 The
first of these was a rather specific rule of thumb which plainly did
not survive in its entirety in all subsequent operations. This was "the
precept that authority granted to the United Nations group cannot
be exercised within a given territory either in competition with representatives of the host Government or in cooperation with them on
the basis of any joint operation."1 43 This specific rule was then further
military force. Similarly, the gradually increasing emphasis upon force in the Security
Council resolutions with respect to ONUC culminating in the Resolution of November 24,
1961, specifically authorizing the Secretary-General "to take vigorous action, including the
use of a requisite measure of force" for the apprehension of mercenaries, did not change
the constitutional character of ONUC so long as such action had the approval of the
recognized government of the Congo. U.N. Doe. No. S/4985 Rev. 1 (1961).
142 Summary Study, para. 165.
143 Ibid. The reason suggested for following this precept was that otherwise "United
Nations units might run the risk of getting involved in differences with the local authorities or public or in internal conflicts which would be highly detrimental to the effectiveness of the operation and to the relations between the United Nations and the host
government." Ibid.
In the situation in which this principle was most radically ignored, the U.N. operation
in West New Guinea, it might also be said that the reason for the rule had no application
because there was in effect no independent local authority or host government. The
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) "itself became, in effect, the
government of the territory for the period of its administration." Bowarr, UNrrf NATIONS
FoRcEs 257 (1964). The United Nations Administrator, under the terms of the agreement,
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developed into the more general one which "precludes the employment of United Nations elements in situations of an essentially internal nature" and admonishes that "United Nations personnel can44
not be permitted in any sense to be a party to internal conflicts."'
Finally, this rule was in turn related to the case of UNEF where "it
was explicitly stated that the Force should not be used to enforce any
specific political solution of pending problems or to influence the
political balance decisive to such a solution."'145 Thus the controlling
principle may be broadly restated as one of impartiality or neutrality
with respect to political conflicts of an internal or external nature,
subject, of course, to the further obligation to be guided by the applicable terms, if any, of the authorizing resolutions.
With respect to the operations of UNEF, the precept of impartiality
was given "full authority under the direction of the Secretary-General to administer the
territory .... " U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. RFec. 17th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 89, at 2
(A/5170) (1962). It further provided that the U.N. forces would "primarily supplement
existing Papuan police in the task of maintaining law and order" and that the "Papuan
Volunteer Corps, which on the arrival of the United Nations Administrator will cease being
part of the Netherlands armed forces, and the Indonesian armed forces in the territory will
be under the authority of, and at the disposal of, the Secretary-General for the same purpose." Ibid.
The situation in Cyprus afforded another example of departure from the principle of
strict separation of U.N. forces from local forces in the maintenance of internal order.
This has been particularly true of the work of the civilian police units of UNFICYP. The
Secretary-General in his report of March 11, 1965, U.N. Doe. No. S/6228, para. 112 (1965),
said: "Their functions, wherever possible, are carried out in co-operation with local police
personnel." Similarly, in the report of December 12, 1964, the Secretary-General said:
"Regarding its investigations of incidents in which the aspect of inter-communal strife
may be of significance, UNCIVPOL always bears in mind the fact that the government has
the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order in the country.
Accordingly, UNCIVPOL endeavours, whenever possible, to carry out its functions under
the Mandate, in co-operation with the local police, with a view to assisting in reaching
objective conclusions." U.N. Doc. No. S/6102, para. 121 (1965). One particular aspect of
this cooperation was brought out in the Report of June 15, 1964, where it is stated: "The
uniformed branch [of the civilian police] has been particularly active in supervising the
searches carried out at roadblocks by Greek Cypriot policemen and have, by their presence,
prevented excessive and humiliating searches of Turkish Cypriots." U.N. Doe. No. S/5764,
para. 54 (1964).
144 Summary Study, para. 166. This emphasis upon abstinence from internal conflicts
apparently reflected the experience in Lebanon and the Secretary-General's concern to
separate the problem of outside interference from internal political conflict in that
situation. The Congo and Cyprus presented situations in which it was much more difficult to make such a distinction. In any event, it would appear that the decision as to
whether a particular case of internal conflict presents a threat to world peace justifying
U.N. intervention is a highly political one which must be left to the Security Council
or the General Assembly, with such advice as the Secretary-General may provide.
145 Summary Study, para. 167. This rule was also restated in the first report on the
Congo operation. U.N. SECuRIrY CouNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at

19 (S/4389) (1960).
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was relatively easy to apply once the exact nature of the operation was
established. In the formative stages, however, it was not quite that
simple. As already indicated, there was, for example, the question
whether the deployment of the Force in the Gaza Strip implied responsibility in the United Nations for administration of that territory. As the events turned out, the government of Egypt was allowed
to take over responsibility for such administration almost immediately
following the entry of UNEF. 14 Thus the assumption of military
control by the U.N. Force, in place of Israeli military control, led to a
political solution in the area which had not been expressly accepted
in advance by Israel and which was apparently contrary to its expectations. Perhaps Israel would have been more outraged if it had
not been conversely the beneficiary of a temporary political solution, to which Egypt had not explicitly agreed, by the deployment
of UNEF in the area of Sharm el Sheikh, on the shores of the Gulf
of Aqaba. Israel asked for specific assurances that UNEF would maintain freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of
Aqaba and would remain there until other effective means for ensuring
such a permanent solution were agreed upon between the parties concerned, 147 but the Secretary-General was reluctant to describe the functions of UNEF so explicitly. He preferred to say that: "[I]n accordance with the general legal principles recognized for the deployment
of the United Nations Emergency Force, the Force should not be used
so as to prejudge the solution of the controversial legal questions involved. The Force, thus, is not to be deployed in such a way as to
protect any special position on these questions, although, at least
transitionally, it may function in support of mutual restraint in accordance with the foregoing."' 48 This assurance of impartiality was not
itself sufficient to induce Israel to turn over control of Sharm el Sheikh
to UNEF. It was only after the United States had publicly taken the
position that UNEF should be stationed at Sharm el Sheikh until it
was clear that Israel's right of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba had
been established in practice, and had assured Israel that it would join
with others to secure general recognition of this right, that the transfer
of control was accomplished. 149 Since then the effective patrol by UNEF
of the land along the straits to the Gulf of Aqaba, assuring the undisturbed entrance of trading vessels through the channel, has been one
146 ROSNER, THE UNrrD NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE 89-91 (1963).

147 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc.
(A/3511) (1957).

l1th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, at 45-46

148 Id. at 50 (A/3512).
149 ROSNER, op. cit supra note 146, at 96-97.
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of the most important contributions of UNEF to the maintenance of
peace in the Middle East. In this area, too, the assumption of military
control by the U.N. Force had the effect of imposing a temporary political solution not agreed upon in advance.
The foregoing qualifications of neutrality, if such they may be called,
were accomplished once the basic functions of the UNEF were established and did not provide a continuing source of controversy in its
operations. Quite the opposite was true in the Congo, where Mr.
Hammarskjold was almost continuously engaged in defending the
principle that the United Nations should not be party to internal
political conflicts. This first occurred in the controversy with Prime
Minister Lumumba over whether U.N. troops should be used in helping
the Central Government in Leopoldville to extend its effective control into the province of Katanga and thus to terminate the attempted
secession of Tshombe and his supporters. The theoretical aspects of
this controversy were most fully developed in an exchange of memoranda between the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister, later
circulated to the Security Council, regarding the proper interpretation
of the Resolution of August 9, 1960. This resolution, besides calling
upon Belgium "to withdraw immediately its troops from the province
of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the SecretaryGeneral," and declaring that "the entry of the United Nations Force
into the province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation
of this resolution," contained the following paragraph:
Reaffirms that the United Nations Force in the Congo will
not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to
influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional
or otherwise ....150
The Secretary-General interpreted this to mean, in concrete terms
applicable to the conflict between the Central Government and
Katanga, that once the Belgian troops were withdrawn, "the question
between the provincial government and the Central Government
would be one in which the United Nations would in no sense be a
party and on which it could in no sense exert an influence."' 51 To this
150 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 92 (S/4426)
(1960). (Italics in original.) It is probably fair to add that the inclusion of this paragraph
was at least partly in response to the Secretary-General's suggestions for clarification of
ONUC's mandate so as to smooth the way for a peaceful entrance into Katanga. Thus he
said in his Second Report: "The Security Council may wish to clarify its views on the
matter and to lay down such rules for the United Nations operation as would serve to
separate effectively questions of a peaceful and democratic development in the constitutional field from any questions relating to the presence of the United Nations Force."

Id. at 53 (S/4417).
151 Id. at 65-70 (S/4417/Add.6).
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general proposition, the Secretary-General added certain specifics,
such as that "the United Nations Force cannot be used on behalf of
the Central Government to subdue or to force the provincial government to a specific line of action"; that "United Nations facilities cannot be used ...to transport civilian or military representatives, under
the authority of the Central Government, to Katanga against the decision of the Katanga provincial government"; and that "the United
Nations Force has no duty, or right, to protect civilian or military
personnel representing the Central Government, arriving in Katanga,
beyond what follows from its general duty to maintain law and
order.'

52

This was, in fact, a specification of the very actions which

Lumumba had unsuccessfully demanded of ONUC. For guidance in
interpretation the Secretary-General also relied upon the precedent
of Lebanon, in which he said the United Nations had carefully limited
its observation activities to detecting possible outside intervention on
behalf of the rebels and would not have considered giving the constitutional government direct aid in suppression of the rebellion.

53

In challenging this interpretation, Lumumba pointed both to the
original resolution concerning the Congo, which authorized the Secretary-General "to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the
Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the government
with such military assistance as may be necessary ....-;154 and also to
the provision of the resolution of the Security Council, of July 22,
1960, which called upon all states "to refrain from any action which
might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo."' 55 These resolutions, he argued,
provided a continuing mandate, reaffirmed by the Resolution of
August 9, to help the Central Government maintain its authority
throughout the Republic of the Congo, against both foreign aggression
and also internal dissension. In addition, Prime Minister Lumumba
suggested that the precedent of Lebanon was not relevant because the
U.N. authorizing resolutions were not identical. 56 The controversy was
Id. at 70.
at 64-65.
154 Id. at 16 (S/4387).
155 Id. at 34 (S/4405).
156 Id. at 71-72 (S/4417/Add.7). The resolution on Lebanon, Security Council Resolution
128, U.N. Doc. No. S/4023 (1958), in its operative paragraphs read:
1. Decides to dispatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon
so as to insure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply or arms
or other material across the Lebanese border.
2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to that end.
3. Requests the observer group to keep the Security Council currently informed
through the Secretary-General.
152

153 Id.
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resolved when the Secretary-General submitted it to the Security Council, where his view was vindicated both by expressions of support
and agreement by most of the members and by the failure of the
Council to adopt any formal resolution disavowing his interpretation.
Despite this vindication, the applicability to the question of
Katanga's secession of the principle against taking sides in internal
political conflict was hardly as clear as the Secretary-General asserted.
The United Nations was already committed to treating the Congo as
a single nation whose territory included Katanga. In insisting upon
ONUC's right of entry into Katanga, based upon the consent of the
Central Government, the United Nations recognized the sovereignty
of the Central Government with respect to the entire territory of the
Republic of the Congo; to that extent, the United Nations was already
in direct opposition to Katanga's assertion of independence. Similarly,
later, when the United Nations undertook to evacuate mercenaries in
the service of the provincial government, it was impliedly recognizing
the sovereignty of the Central Government in Katanga. Otherwise,
the government of Katanga would have had just as much right to employ mercenaries and political advisers as did the Central Government
-a right which the United Nations did not challenge so far as the
Central Government was concerned. 57 In other words, the legal basis
for the very presence of ONUC in Katanga and for the most significant
initiative which it took there during Hammarskjold's life constituted
The debate between the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister was in effect continued
before the Security Council. There the Secretary-General developed the additional constitutional argument that intervention by the United Nations in an internal conflict, when
the Council had not specifically adopted enforcement measures under articles 41 and 42
of chapter VII of the Charter, might well be regarded as a violation of the domestic
jurisdiction limitation of article 2 of paragraph 7 of the Charter. U.N. SEcuRrry COUNCIL
OFF. RiEC. 15th year, 887th meeting 9-10 (S/PV.887) (1960). The Secretary-General's constitutional proposition is open to question as applied to the particular situation. Compare
Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations, in II RFCuEiL
DES CoORs, 169, 219 (1963); Sohn, The Role of the United Nations in Civil Wars, Amer. Soc.
of Int'l Law, Proceedings 208 (1963). See also U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 15th year,
888th, 889th meetings (S/PV.888), (S/PV.889) (1960); Halderman, Legal Basis for the United
Nations Armed Forces, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 971 (1962).
157 True, the Resolution of February 21, 1961, urged that "measures be taken for the
immediate withdrawal of and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign
military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations
command, and mercenaries ....
" U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 16th year, Supp. Jan.March 1961, at 147 (S/4741) (1961). But the resolution did not purport to authorize the
Secretary-General to take such measures without the consent of the government of the
Congo. In this connection, it will be recalled that the purported legal basis for Rumpunch,
the operation designed to round up the mercenaries in Katanga, was an ordinance of the
Central Government directing their expulsion, yet exempting foreign personnel in the
employ of the Central Government itself.
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recognition of the Central Government's authority in Katanga and a

denial of the right of secession.
The most satisfactory explanation of the apparent inconsistencies in
Hammarskjold's application of the principle of neutrality to the dispute
between Katanga and the Central Government is that he did not really
mean to apply the principle to the issue of the secession of Katanga.
Indeed, his basic attitude on this issue seemed to be to refuse to take
the secession seriously. Instead he regarded it more as a bargaining
counter designed to strengthen the case for a federal rather than a
unitary form of government. 158 He did not regard the exact form of the
union, or the specific provisions of the Loi fondamentale, on which
the Central Government relied, as sacrosanct and looked forward to
some sort of accommodation between Katanga's claim of complete
independence and Leopoldville's claims of complete domination. Presumably he hoped that the continued presence of ONUC in Katanga,
the elimination of the mercenaries and of the most recalcitrant foreign
advisers, and pressures from the outside would gradually induce such

an accommodation without resort to open warfare by ONUC against
Katanga. It fell to U Thant, rather than to Hammarskjold, to attempt
to carry out this policy of mediation and gradual pressures in the
hope of eventually inducing a settlement. 159
158 This is illustrated by the following passage in the Second Report: "Nor is the problem a desire on the part of the authorities of the province to secede from the Republic of
the Congo. The question is a constitutional one with strong undercurrents of individual
and collective political aims. The problem for those resisting the United Nations Force in
Katanga may be stated in these terms: Will United Nations participation in security control
in Katanga submit the province to the immediate control and authority of the Central
Government against its wishes? They consider this seriously to jeopardize their possibility
to work for other constitutional solutions than a strictly unitarian one, e.g. some kind of
federal structure providing for a higher degree of provincial self-government than now
foreseen. The spokesmen for this attitude reject the unitarian formula as incompatible
with the interests of the whole Congo people and as imposed from outside." U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL OFF.REc. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 53 (S/4417) (1960).
159 Secretary-General'sReport of Feb. 4, 1963, U.N. SECUITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 18th
year, Supp. Jan.-March 1963, at 93-94 (Sf5240) (1963). Commenting specifically upon the
principle of noninterference in the internal political affairs of the Congo, this report
states: "The United Nations has avoided any intervention in the internal politics of the
country, beyond the opposition to secession in general required by the Security Council
resolutions and the constitutional suggestions embodied in the Plan for National Reconciliation, which after all, was only a proposal which each party was free to accept or
reject.

"The United Nations Operation in the Congo has also adhered to the principle of
avoiding the use of force for political purposes, although it is true that the very presence
and activity of the United Nations Force in the Congo has been an important factor in
giving effective weight to United Nations opposition to secession, whether in Katanga,
Kasai, or elsewhere in the country." Id. at 103.
Apparently U Thant went so far as to authorize the U.N. Force to give military assistance
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Although it may be a little hard to believe that Hammarskjold
would have been as outspoken as U Thant in soliciting and applying
such outside pressures, he might well have recognized a difference
between requirements of neutrality when applied to nonmilitary as
distinguished from military U.N. intervention. The former may take a
variety of forms, including the appointment of a mediator, as in
Cyprus, or the provision of technical legal assistance and the development of specific constitutional proposals, as in the Congo; with respect
to such nonmilitary intervention by the Secretary-General, the principle of neutrality, although generally applicable, may not be quite as
limiting as in the case of the use of armed force.
The other great test of the principle of neutrality or impartiality in
the Congo operation was provided by the contest between Kasavubu
and Lumumba for control of the Central Government. 160 The obligation of the U.N. Force to be neutral in this dispute was never even
seriously questioned; the problem was how to preserve such neutrality
without practically suspending the entire U.N. operation in the Congo.
The problem became particularly serious when the conflict between
Kasavubu and Lumumba had reached a virtual stalemate, with each
purporting to dismiss the other, and when Mobutu, the Chief of Staff,
had undertaken to establish a kind of provisional, nonpolitical government called the College of Commissioners. The dilemma thus presented
to the United Nations was graphically described in the First Progress
Report to the Secretary-General from his special representative in the
Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal:
In this confused situation, with three rival governments
jockeying for position, and each demanding as of right the
enlistment of ONUC's support to enforce its own particular
political solution, any action taken by ONUC in the performance of its disinterested mission has been liable to be seized
upon by one or more groups, for reason of political advantage,
as a basis for the unfounded charge of intervention in the
domestic affairs of the country. In such a situation ONUC
has maintained with scrupulous care an attitude of strict
to the Central Government in arresting Gizenga and putting an end to secession in
Stanleyville, in January 1962, but such assistance was not actually required or used at
that time. HOSKYNS, THE CONGO SINCE INDEPENDENCE 459 (1965).
160 See, for example, the reports of the meetings between the representatives of the
Central Government and the representatives of Katanga with respect to a constitutional
settlement in March, April, May, and June 1962, including the participation and observations of U.N. representatives, U.N. SrcuRr COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year, Supp. May-June
1962, at 1 (S/5053/Add.10) (1962); and the March 26, 1965 Report of the United Nations
Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General,U.N. Doc. No. S/6253 (1965).
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neutrality, avoiding any action which could be interpreted,
even remotely, as influencing the political balance.' 6'
But not every one agreed that ONUC had been as successful in
maintaining strict neutrality as Mr. Dayal implied. Particular criticism
was leveled at the closing of the airports and radio station to both
sides ordered by Mr. Dayal's predecessor, Andrew Cordier, early in
the conflict between Kasavubu and Lumumba. Mr. Cordier ordered
the action because he feared that there might be incitement to violence
on the radio, and also movement of troops through the airports for
purposes of civil war. This enforced damper upon both public appeals
and military movements probably worked to the disadvantage of
Lumumba, since he was generally more able to arouse popular enthusiasm and also because his most reliable military support was in Stanleyville and had to be flown to Leopoldville to be effective in the
struggle for control of the Central Government. 162 This isolation of
Lumumba also enabled Mobutu to use the military forces at his disposal to install the College of Commissioners, disperse Parliament, and
eventually establish a coalition government with Kasavubu.
The significant question posed by this course of events is how,
if at all, it is possible for the United Nations to maintain neutrality
in such a political conflict when charged with the kind of responsibilities it had assumed in the Congo. One astute observer has suggested that the fault lay primarily not in what the United Nations did,
but in what it left undone. 16 3 Having in effect deprived Lumumba of
his two principal weapons, popular appeal and military support, was
there not some further obligation incumbent upon the United Nations
to prevent Kasavubu and Mobutu from forming a coalition against him
and freezing him out of the government? Just what those constructive
steps should have been is much more difficult to specify. Conceivably
the United Nations might have exerted general pressure for a negotiated settlement, which would have included Lumumba in the govern161 Id. at 184. The contest between rival governments is described with both detail and
clarity in HosKYNs, op. cit. supra note 159, at 196. It is also reflected in many U.N. documents, including particularly, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. R1c. 15th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item
No. 85, at 6 (A/4557) (1961); Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the
Congo, Id. at 69 (A/4711); U.N. Sacuarry COUNCIL OFF. RiEc. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept.
1960, at 176 (S/4531) (1960).
162 LErvER, CRISIS IN THE CONGO 46-47 (1965).
163 As Miss Hoskyns puts it: "The real criticism against Hammarskjold and his officials
at this point is not therefore that they took action to prevent an outbreak of violence, but
that they allowed the hostility which they felt for Lumumba and his regime to blind them
to the constructive steps which they might have taken." HOSKYNS, op. cit. supra note 159,
at 224.

19661

Constitutional Crisis at the U.N.

ment, but the greatest obstacle to such a settlement might well have
been Lumumba's own intransigence. If this had proved the case,
ONUC might have guaranteed Lumumba's safe return to his own
stronghold of Stanleyville, instead of granting him protection only
within the U.N. encampment, where he was politically sterile. Whether
this would have enhanced or decreased the "agony of the Congo"
requires a guess far beyond the compass of this essay. Suffice it to suggest that it would have given more color to the U.N. claim of absolute
impartiality and avoided the wave of bitter recriminations which immediately followed Lumumba's murder. Doubtless, too, it would have
presented a continuing problem of internal dissension between three
basic centers of power, Leopoldville, Stanleyville, and Elisabethville,
but this was a problem which still had to be faced whether Lumumba
lived on only in person or more vividly in the minds of his coun164
trymen.
Turning from the Congo to Cyprus, one might expect, a priori, the
principle of neutrality or impartiality to be even more sharply tested
in the latter situation, since the basic dispute which triggered the
outbreak of violence and eventually required U.N. intervention was
clearly a matter of internal political conflict. Indeed, the United
Nations might have been confronted from the outset with the very
question which developed during the course of operations in the
Congo, namely, what was the lawful government of the host state. The
government in effective control of most of the island and most of the
legal processes of the state was, of course, the government of President
Makarios; he was acting, however, without the constitutionally required concurrence of Vice President Kuchuk and other ministers
representing the Turkish Cypriot community. Although the validity
of much that was done was denied on this ground by the Turkish
Cypriot community and by Turkey, these objections were never carried
to the point of challenging the credentials of the representative of the
government of Cyprus before the Security Council.0 5 This very accep164 Id. at 317-18; Ansley, The Congo Rebellion, 21 WORMr TODAY 169 (1965). Entirely
apart from such speculations as to what might have been, the conflict as to the lawful government of the Republic of the Congo was eventually determined for the United Nations,
at least, by the General Assembly in the seating of the representatives of Kasavubu as
opposed to those of Lumumba. See generally U.N. GEM. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., Plenary
912, 913, 917-24 (A/PV.912), (A/PV.913), (A/PV.917-A/PV.924) (1960).
165 There were some occasional references to the representatives of the government of
Cyprus as the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, but these were never carried
to their ultimate conclusion. See, e.g., U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REac. 19th year, 1099th
meeting 2 (S/PV.1099) (1964). Since Turkey itself, as well as other members of the United
Nations, continued to treat the Makarios government as the government of Cyprus, it
could hardly ask the United Nations to do otherwise. Nevertheless, in subsequent debates
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tance of the government of President Makarios as the government of
the Republic of Cyprus for the purposes of the United Nations had
a large bearing on the realities of UNFICYP's position as a neutral
or impartial keeper of the peace between the two communities.
The inescapable effect of recognition of the Makarios government,
favoring the Greek Cypriot position, was demonstrated most sharply
in connection with the problem of the buildup of arms by both sides.
As mentioned earlier, one of the principal functions assumed by
UNFICYP, though its legal basis was never explicitly defined, was to
check the smuggling of arms into the country by either Greek or
Turkish Cypriots. But the term "smuggling" did not apply to the
import or manufacture of arms by the government. So interpreted, a
ban on smuggling would mean that the government was free to
strengthen its military position while the Turkish Cypriot community
did not enjoy a similar freedom. The implications of the situation were
recognized by the Secretary-General very early in the operation when
he raised the question: "[W]hether at the present time and in the
present circumstances, the import and manufacture of arms by the Government of Cyprus is within the letter and/or spirit of the Security
Council resolution of 4 March." 16 6 Unfortunately, there is no indication
that the Secretary-General ever received a satisfactory answer to that
question.167 The upshot of this particular issue was that the buildup of
arms continued on both sides, on the government side more or less
openly, through the importation of arms and an increase in the
National Guard, and on the Turkish Cypriot side clandestinely, by
smuggling into the areas under its control military personnel and
the representative of Turkey continued to challenge the right of the Makarios government
to be treated as the legal government of Cyprus. See, e.g., U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc.
19th year, 1138th meeting 27 (S/PV.1138) (1964). A further complication was that the
withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the government was in a sense voluntary, whatever the provocation may have been. Compare Crawshaw, Cyprus: Collapse of the Zurich
Agreement, 20 WORLD TODAY 338 (1964).

166 U.N. Doc. No. S/5764, para. 120 (1964).
167 The Secretary-General referred again to the problem in his Report of September

10, 1964, saying: "My Special Representative and the Force Commander have raised the
question of the dangers of the arms build-up several times with the President of Cyprus
who, while insisting on the duty and responsibility of his Government to build up its

forces, assured them that the heavy weapons imported would be used only for the defense
of the country against foreign invasions and not in the internal confficts." U.N. Doc. No.

S/5950, para. 39 (1964). Several members of the Security Council expressed individual views
deploring the arms build-up as inconsistent with the resolution, but there was no formal
action or informal consensus developed with respect to the problem. See, e.g., statement of
United States representative, U.N. SECuRIrY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 19th year, 1138th meeting

42 (S/PV.1138) (1964).
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equipment.10 6 The inevitable effect, apart from a general heightening
of tension, was a strengthening of the government's military position
vis-A-vis both the Turkish Cypriot community and the U.N. Force. 169
UNFICYP's inability to prevent government importation of arms
made it more difficult to accomplish another one of the SecretaryGeneral's specific objectives: "Progressive evacuation and removal of
all fortified positions held by Greek and Turkish Cypriots."' 7 0 In his
Report of September 10, 1964, the Secretary-General indicated a mixed
picture of success and failure in the constant endeavor to secure a
removal of fortifications, and explained some of the reasons for lack of
success:
The Turkish Cypriot fighters, who are substantially outnumbered and outgunned by the National Guard, have been

opposed to giving up fortified positions on two main grounds:
they control little territory and have therefore no place to
withdraw; moreover, they contend that UNFICYP has not
the capability to resist an organized attack, if such an attack
were mounted by the Government on interposed UNFICYP
positions. If these positions were to be overrun, the situation
of the Turkish Cypriots might become well nigh untenable.
The Turkish Cypriots have therefore insisted on maintaining
their fortified posts and have even extended some of their for171
tifications in Nicosia.
Another, even more realistic fear, might have been the eventuality
of a termination of the UNFICYP operation entirely, before the
achievement of a peaceful solution of the basic dispute. Under these
circumstances, it is not surprising that the Secretary-General reported on
March 11, 1965, that "there has been virtually no reduction in the
scale of fortifications, and in fact in Kokkina, Nicosia and Famagusta
a number of additional barricades, trenches and sandbagged fortifications have been dug or erected."' 172 UNFICYP tried to overcome this
reluctance, especially of the Turkish Cypriots, to dismantle fortifi168 U.N. Doc. No. S/5950, paras. 41, 42 (1964).
169 Id. para. 228.
170 Secretary-General'sReport of April 29, 1964, U.N. Doc. No. S/5671, Annex I, para. 1

(1964). In his Report of June 15, 1964, the Secretary-General mentioned that "proposals had
been put forward both to the Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leaders, including
different plans, especially for the removal of fortifications in the city of Nicosia, and in
the Kyrenia range," but that no agreement had been reached and no progress had been
made in those areas although some progress had been made in other areas. U.N. Doe. No.
S/5764, para. 61 (1964).
171 U.N. Doc. No. S/6102, para. 161 (1964).
172 U.N. Doe. No. S/6228, para. 51 (1965).
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cations by undertaking to "take steps to ensure, by demarcation of
existing positions, by redeployment, and by the use of force in selfdefense as a last resort, that none of the positions left unmanned as a
result of the disengagement programme would be occupied by the
opposing side, and that no infiltration would take place."'1 3 These
proposals elicited some favorable response and even a measure of unilateral removal of armed posts and fortifications on the government's
side, but very little from the Turkish Cypriots, except for a promise
not to take any military advantage of the government's withdrawal.7 4
Perhaps this was a situation where greater insistence by UNFICYP
upon reciprocal withdrawal by both sides would have been a violation
of realistic neutrality.
Even more subtle and difficult to assess is the relationship between
UNFICYP's efforts "to contribute to a return to normal conditions,"
and its basic commitment to impartiality so far as the underlying
dispute is concerned. The critical question has been whether a return
to normality would consolidate control of the government in the hands
of the Greek Cypriots. The general outlines of the problem are suggested in an exchange of memoranda, dated November 23, 1964, and
December 6, 1964, respectively, between UNFICYP and Vice President
Kuchuk, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. 75 The
UNFICYP memoranda suggested among other things, further steps to
ensure freedom of movement for all members of both communities
throughout the island, and the return to duty of all Turkish Cypriot
administrative and clerical staff of the courts. In response to these
suggestions the Vice President said in part:
(b) The suggestions made in the aide-mmoire envisage return to a normality which, far from being within the framework and spirit of the Constitution, of the laws of the country
and of the United Nations Security Council resolution of
4 March, is in accord with the unlawful situation which the
Greek Cypriot leadership has brought about by the use of
force and violence and tend to consolidate such a situation;
.
-

(d) If the suggestions and the recommendations in the

aide-mdmoire are accepted, it will mean that the unlawful
situation which the Greeks have been trying to perpetuate by
the use of force and violence will be consolidated with the
assistance and support of UNFICYP and thus a kind of politi173
174

U.N. Doc. No. S16426, para. 44 (1965).
Id. paras. 45-46.

175 U.N. Doc. No. S/6102, Annexes V, VI (1964).
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cal solution which the Greeks want to impose on the Turks
76
will gain ground.
The Secretary-General developed his own analysis of this problem
in his report of March 11, 1965, in the following terms:
UNFICYP by its very nature cannot wholly satisfy the aspirations and aims of either community in Cyprus. On the
one hand, it cannot act as the instrument of the Government
in helping it to extend its authority by force over the Turkish
Cypriot community in the areas now under its control. On
the other hand, it cannot assume responsibility for restoring
the constitutional position which existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1963 and early 1964 nor to contribute to
the consolidation of the present stalemate in the Island. Both
of these courses would basically affect a final settlement of
the country's problems, a matter which is in the province of
the Mediator and not of UNFICYP. UNFICYP's action is
limited to doing its best to halt violence, to promote a reduction in tension and to restore normal conditions of life, thus
creating an atmosphere more favourable to the efforts to
achieve a long-term settlement. 177
Despite the impeccable logic of this position it could hardly be gainsaid
that the Secretary-General's program for a gradual return to normality
through economic reintegration of the two communities and the
return of the Turkish Cypriots to full administrative and judicial
participation in the government would tend to put the stamp of
fait accompli upon the Greek Cypriot resolution of the stalemate and
to make less likely of fulfillment the Turkish Cypriot dream of a
178
federalist state.
176 Id. Annex VI, para. 1.
177 U.N. Doc. No. S/6228, para. 274 (1965).

178 This is partially recognized in the Secretary-General's comment on the same problem in the Report of June 10, 1965, U.N. Doc. No. S/6426, para. 106 (1965): "The Turkish
Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve
having members of the two communities live and work together, or which might place
Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would have to acknowledge the authority of
Government agents. Indeed, since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed to physical
and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to
encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the
merits of an alternative policy. The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of selfsegregation by the Turkish Cypriots. The Government contends that the hardships suffered
by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership's self-isolation
policy, imposed by force on the rank and file. The Turkish Cypriots assert that these
hardships are designed by the Government to pressure the Turkish community into
submission and to destroy it politically and that Turkish Cypriots are at one in their
determination to resist."
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These balancing acts which the United Nations has had to perform
in both the Congo and Cyprus might well be taken as demonstrations
of the prescience of Hammarskjold's admonition against "employment
of United Nations' elements in situations of an essentially internal
nature." Nevertheless, realism also requires us to acknowledge that in
the modern world it is frequently impossible to separate internal conflicts from threats to world peace. If the United Nations were to be
wholly faithful to Hammarskjold's precept, it would be condemned to
sitting on the sidelines, at least so far as peace-keeping operations are
concerned, in a good many of the world's most dangerous trouble spots.
As U Thant seems to have regretfully concluded in respect to Cyprus,
the United Nations may have an inescapable role to play in keeping
the peace in what is essentially a civil war situation, even though the
peace-keeper's lot will not be a happy one. 179 Once catapulted into such
a situation, of course, the guiding principle must be one of neutrality
or impartiality with respect to the underlying dispute; the peace-keeping force must not "be used to enforce any specific political solution of
pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such
a solution." So stated, the principle is almost a truism. The difficulties
arise when a choice must be made between what are on their face
equally impartial courses of conduct-to close or not to close the
airports or radio stations, to prevent or not to prevent smuggling, to
remove or not to remove fortifications, to protect or not to protect
contending politicians from political arrest, to provide or not to provide safe conduct on political or other missions. Obviously the list
might be extended with many other examples. Being true to the principle of impartiality in such situations requires to some extent a weighing of the consequences. It may also require some consideration and
interpretation of the mandate under which the Force operates. Did the
authority to provide the government of the Republic of the Congo
"with such military assistance as may be necessary" imply the authority,
and even the obligation, to assist that government with military force
in putting down secession of any one of the provinces, or was it limited
in the context of the situation to assistance in the maintenance of law
and order, that is, to the prevention of anarchy? Given the deliberate
ambiguity of many resolutions the answer may have to be found, not
in the intention of the sponsors nor in the principle of impartiality,
but in the good sense of the administrator as to what course in the
long run will best contribute to the accomplishment of the mission.
179 See, for example, the concluding observations in both the Report of June 10, 1965,
U.N. Doe. No. S/6426, paras. 182-89 (1965), and the Report of Dec. 10, 1965, U.N. Doc. No.
S/7001, paras. 205-18 (1965).

1966]

Constitutional Crisis at the U.N.
V.

CONCLUDING

OBSERVATIONS

And now we must return to the question with which this long
journey started-whether we can find in the experience of peace keeping the enunciation or development of a body of "principles and purposes," "legal doctrine and precepts" which tend to make it "possible
for the Secretary-General to carry out his tasks in controversial political
situations with full regard to his exclusively international obligation
under the Charter and without subservience to a particular national or
ideological attitude."' 8 0 Obviously the great exponent and architect
of such development has been Dag Hammarskjold himself, not only in
the Oxford Address, but in the day-to-day work of his office, including
such notable examples as the Summary Study and the occasional reports to the General Assembly or Security Council. It is noteworthy
that this attempt to develop a body of principles began before there
was any intimation of a serious split between the Secretary-General
and the Soviet Union with regard to the executive responsibilities of
the Secretariat. The development of administrative standards did not
begin as a kind of self-serving declaration to furnish support in the
great debate; rather it grew naturally out of a conscientious discharge
of the responsibilities devolved upon the Secretariat by the governing
bodies of the United Nations. Finally, it should be noted that the reliance upon principles in the course of operations did not cease with
the death of Hammarskjold, and that the fundamental themes remained the same even if the emphasis and the manner of expression
changed with the change of personalities and the broadening of the
relevant experience.
Nevertheless, it would be idle to pretend that the experience thus
far points clearly in one direction or another in answer to the ultimate question confronting us. The duration of a peace-keeping operation, for example, seems plainly a matter for resolution at the highest
political level available, whether its termination involves the acquiescence, opposition, or insistence of the host state. The Secretary-General may indeed have an important and even decisive role to play in
reaching the decision, but his role will be primarily that of adviser to
the political organs rather than administrator of any general policy
which can be meaningfully declared in advance. Quite the opposite
would seem to be true of the composition of the Force. Here the interests of administration bulk large while the political interests should
for the most part be secondary3 8 '. This assumes, of course, that the
180 HAMMARSKJOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANT IN LAW AND IN FAcr 329, 346-47

(1962).
181 The delicate combination of administrative and political considerations involved
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general prohibition against Great Power participation will be followed
unless there is informal agreement in advance that the prohibition
may be waived. Adjustment of any other political requirements regarding the composition of the Force, particularly sensitivities of the
host state, may well be left to the judgment of the Secretary-General.
Apart from such special considerations, a U.N. Force should be peculiarly designed as a nonpolitical instrument. As such, its composition
is particularly appropriate for delegation to the Secretary-General with
a large measure of uninhibited discretion.
As for the other major themes developed in the Summary Studyfreedom of movement, use of force only in self-defense, and impartiality in political disputes-it must be conceded that they are frequently difficult of application and sometimes even point in opposite
directions. Shall we conclude from this that the principles are not
really helpful guides to decision making, but merely intellectual
faades designed to give an appearance of rationality to a course of
executive conduct based largely on intuition and the demands of expediency? Choosing the most difficult examples, the reliance upon
principle as the basis for decision in some of the most trying moments
of the Congo experience did not always carry a convincing ring of
reality. This was particularly true of Hammarskjold's reliance upon
the obligations of neutrality and the precedent of Lebanon as the
grounds for refusing to commit ONUC to the aid of the Central Government in the subjugation of Katanga. Nevertheless, the false ring
of the argument may be due more to the unfortunate choice of analogies and method of expression than to the lack of applicable grounds
of general principle. This was a situation where the U.N. commitment
to give military assistance to the Central Government and to preserve
the territorial integrity of the Congo pointed in one direction, while
its commitment to restraint in the use of force and to impartiality in
internal political disputes pointed in the other. But the choice involved
did not necessarily imply a complete sacrifice of either set of commitin the composition of the U.N. Forces is well illustrated in the Survey of the United
Nations Emergency Force, U.N. Doc. No. A/C.5/1049 (1965). The Survey Team concluded
that efficiency would be increased and expenses reduced if fewer countries were represented
in the Force, especially "if the Secretary-General were able to change the composition of
the Force either by retaining only those contingents whose Governments' claims are
relatively low, or by replacing expensive contingents by less costly ones." Id. para. 89,
at 17. But the report also states: "Obviously there are overriding political considerations which rule out a number of simple solutions. For example, it is desirable and
necessary to maintain a broad geographical basis for the Force, even though this undoubtedly complicates its structure and adds to its expense ...." Id. para. 17, at 10. The
solution suggested by the Survey Team was a system of rotation of contributions among
several different countries. Id. paras. 25, 40, at 18, 17.
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ments. Doubtless Hammarskjold hoped in the long run to preserve the
territorial integrity of the Congo without a premature exercise of force
by the United Nations and without imposing on either side complete
acceptance of the views of the other. To explain all this to the impetuous men in Leopoldville would not have been an easy task in any
language; it was not made any easier by the legalistic language of the
Hammarskjold memorandum. But the rather obvious failure of communication does not establish either the irrelevancy of the general
principles or their irreconcilability.
The apparent breakdown of communication or understanding between the top echelons of the Secretariat and Conor Cruise O'Brien,
their man in Katanga, with respect to "Operation Morthor," the abortive attempt in September 1961 to end Katanga's secession by force,
might also suggest some suspicious inquiries regarding the importance
of the principles in guiding operations. If the operation had been successful, would it have been happily acknowledged as a reasonable application of the use of force in self-defense while carrying out ONUC's
mandate to evacuate mercenaries and to assure ONUC's freedom of
movement, just as the subsequent unauthorized but successful breakthrough into Jadotville was welcomed and justified? If not, why did the
official description of the events emphasize "the menace to the security
of the United Nations personnel and property" and explain that "the
UN forces therefore took security precautions while the UN resumed
carrying out its task of apprehending and evacuating foreign military
and para-military personnel."'8 2 Here again, as in the debate with Lumumba, the credibility of the principle may have suffered from overzealousness in the argumentation. Apparently Hammarskjold concluded that he could neither ratify the operations as planned nor
disavow the actions of his subordinates, no matter how misguided he
may have regarded them; the course he chose was to reinterpret facts in
the light of what he regarded as the controlling principles. In retrospect
this seems to have been an unfortunate choice from the point of view
of the overall credibility of the Secretariat's rationalization of peacekeeping operations. But it is certainly not an uncommon phenomenon
in all types of government and may be especially excusable in the light
of tremendous political pressures under which the United Nations was
then operating in the Congo.
In contrast to these somewhat unfortunate examples, it is noteworthy
that the Secretary-General's reports on the Cyprus operation, while
following basically the same pattern as that established by Hammar182 U.N. SECURrrY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 16th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1961, at 101, 103
(S/4940) (1961).
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skjold in the case of UNEF and ONUC, have happily avoided excessive
rationalization and justification of everything that UNFICYP has done.
This may be partly a reflection of the facts that Cyprus, for the United
Nations itself, has not been the pressure cooker the Congo turned out
to be and that the Secretary-General has not been constantly required
to justify every step to one set of critics or another. Perhaps, then, it is
not surprising that the reports have made no attempt to hide the facts
that freedom of movement even for the Force has not always been
fully achieved, that the magic words "self-defense" do not answer every
dilemma which the Force faces, and that even the commitment to impartiality has its pitfalls. Nevertheless, those same reports bear impressive witness to the vitality of the principles which Hammarskjold first
adumbrated in the Summary Study and elaborated in the various
reports on the Congo. As in many other affairs of life, the principles of
peace keeping may be guides even when they are not guideposts. They
have served to give a sense of direction to peace-keeping operations as a
whole, to establish a sense of continuity between one operation and
another, to provide an intellectual framework both for the transfer of
knowledge from one experience to the next and for the testing of that
knowledge against new experience. In short, they have been points of
the compass in a continuing dialogue about the problems and the
potentialities of U.N. forces.
Finally, in attempting to evaluate the significance of the principles
themselves we must not forget one of the very practical objectives
which Hammarskjold had in mind when he first undertook their systematic formulation. In introducing his statement of "Basic Principles"
in the Summary Study, the Secretary-General suggested that they might
be formally approved by the General Assembly as the basis for standby
arrangements to be negotiated by the Secretariat with interested governments for the contribution of troops to future peace-keeping operations.la 3 This proposal was never carried out exactly in the way suggested; the General Assembly did not formally express its approval of
the basic principles. But the substance of the idea has been accomplished as the principles have been referred to again and again in
reports both to the General Assembly and the Security Council and
tacitly accepted as a basis for action by those organs. Thus they have
become part of the common law of the United Nations upon which
member nations may rely in earmarking, training, and contributing
troops for peace-keeping operations184 and which a host state must cer183 Summary Study, para. 154.
184 See FRYDENBERG, PEACE-KEEPING EXPERIENCE AND

EVALUATIoN-THE

OSLO

PAPERS

203-09 (1964). Unpublished papers of the Meeting of Military Experts to Consider the
Technical Aspects of U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations, Ottawa, Nov. 2, 1964 (U.N. Library).
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tainly take into account when agreeing to accept such a Force. That
these principles are vague and to some extent even contradictory does
not exactly distinguish them from comparable principles of domestic
administrative law. 185 Neither are they beyond legislative amendment,
by resolution of the Security Council or the General Assembly as the
case may be. In several instances they have been given a new context
or direction in which to operate, either by explicit provision of a resolution or by tacit acceptance of a specific suggestion or interpretation
of the Secretary-General, as was especially noticeable in the gradual
liberalization of the concept of self-defense. Subject to all of these qualifications and limitations, they are an indispensable part of that body of
"principles and purposes," "legal doctrine and precepts" which should
make it possible for the Security Council or the General Assembly to
delegate to the Secretary-General-if need be in the broadest termsexecutive responsibility for the maintenance of the peace in any situation where the responsible parties to a dispute can be persuaded to
accept U.N. peace-keeping forces.
185
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